On reputation evaluation in 2.0 communities. by Brotto, Cristian
   On Reputation Evaluation in 2.0 Communities
“How reputation evaluation can help WEB2.0, Enterprise2.0 and other Digital Communities 
to improve User Generated Contents quality and foster participation and community growth, 
by a reputation evaluation framework that allows business models 




A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
---
Department of Computer Science
Università degli Studi dellʼInsubria - Varese, ITALY
---
Supervisor: Prof. Gaetano A. Lanzarone
Internal Advisor: Prof. Elena Ferrari
External Advisors:
 Dr. Rosario Sica, OpenKnowledge s.r.l.







1. About WEB2.0: Present, Past and Future! 13
1.1. Introduction! 14
1.2. WEB2.0: The Official Definition! 14
1.3. Web1.0 v.s Web2.0! 15
1.4. Why WEB2.0 is not a New Technology?! 17
1.5. Web2.0: The Web as Participation Platform! 18
1.5.1. Collective Intelligence! 19
1.5.2. User Generated Contents (UGC)! 20
1.5.3. (Active) Collaborative Filtering (CF)! 21
1.6. What the future looks like? - Introducing WEB3.0! 23
2. WEB 2.0 Communities are Social Networks! 25
2.1. Introduction! 26
2.2. Social Networks as Web Services! 26
2.3. The way Social Networking Services Work! 27
2.4. Social Networking Services Categories ! 28
2.4.1. Internal and External Social Networking Services! 28
2.4.2. Business and B2B ESN ! 28
2.4.3. ESN and ISN Side Application Domains! 29
2.5. Social Networks Services Business Models! 31
2.6. World Map of popularity of social networks around the world! 33
2.7. S2W: The Evolution of Social Networking Services! 34
3. Enterprise 2.0: Web 2.0 Goes Business?! 35
3.1. Introduction! 36
2
3.2. About Enterprise 2.0: History and Definitions! 36
3.3. Enterprise 2.0: Why Not Just Web 2.0 behind firewalls?! 38
3.4. Why Enterprise 2.0 has become an appealing reality?! 39
3.5. Social Network Analysis: Investigating Enterprise 2.0 Communities! 41
3.6. SNA Metrics and Examples! 43
3.6.1. Degree Centrality! 43
3.6.2. Betweenness Centrality! 44
3.6.3. Closeness! 45
3.6.4. Eigenvalue! 46
3.6.5. Hub and Authority! 47
3.7. SNA: Conclusions! 48
4. About Reputation and Online Reputation Based Systems! 49
4.1. Introduction! 50
4.2. About Reputation and Reputation Systems! 51
4.2.1. The Reasons Why Reputation Systems are so Important! 52
4.2.2. Is Online Reputation a Less Effective Kind of Reputation?! 53
4.3. Online Reputation Systems and Reputation Metrics! 55
4.3.1. Local vs. Global Trust Metrics: What is Trust and what is Reputation?! 56
4.3.2. Content-Driven Reputation Systems! 58
4.3.3. Ratings-Driven Reputation Systems! 59
4.4. Reputation as a Social and a Real Capital! 61
4.5. Problems and Solutions in Reputation Systems! 62
4.5.1. Problem 1: Reputation Involves Costs and Needs Rewards! 63
4.5.2. Problem2: Avoiding Balance of Powers and Transferability of Reputation! 63
4.5.3. Problem 3: Fraud! 64
4.5.4. Problem 4: Verifying and Validating Assertions! 65
4.5.5. Problem 5: Shilling! 67
4.5.6. Problem 6: Bootstrapping the System! 68
4.5.7. Problem 7: The REAL Reasons of Participations (And Not Participation)! 69
3
4.5.8. Problem 8: Finding Economical Means to Incentive Participation and Leverage 
on Them to Protect or Improve Security and Reliability! 71
4.6. Conclusions! 73
5. Reputation Community Evaluation (RCE) ! 75
5.1. Introduction! 76
5.1.1. How User Generated Contents, Rating Systems and Reputation Systems blend 
together into the Web ! 76
5.2. Defining RCE Building Blocks! 78
5.2.1. Approval Votes! 80
5.2.2. Rating According to Users Reputation and Commitment! 84
5.2.3. Blind Ratings, Voters Anonymity and Bidirectionality! 85
5.2.4. Action and Resource Weights! 88
5.2.5. Complete RCE Model! 88
5.2.6. An Example to Recap ! 89
5.2.7. Reputation Models Chart! 92
5.3. Security in Ratings-Driven Reputation Systems and RCE! 93
5.4. RCE Some More Design Considerations! 94
5.4.1. About Transferability of Reputation! 95
5.4.2. Reputation is Context–Specific! 95
5.4.3. Community Membership Life Cycle and RCE! 96
5.4.4. Social Currencies and Business Models in Online RCE Systems and Enterprise 
RCE Systems! 97
5.4.5. Social and Reputation Translucence ! 100
5.5. RCE Meta-Model and Algorithm! 101
5.5.1. RCE Algorithm! 105
6. weBBrainys.com: Putting Theory Into Practice! 111
6.1. Introduction! 112
6.2. About weBBrainys: A Brief Introduction! 112
6.3. weBBrainys Reputation Algorithm Explained! 112
6.4. weBBrainysʼ Development Tools and Methodologies! 122
6.4.1. Ruby On Rails Web Development Framework! 122
4
6.4.2. Prototype JavaScript Framework and script.aculo.us JavaScript Library! 123
6.4.3. Yahoo User Interface JavaScript Library! 123
6.4.4. Agile Software Development! 124
6.5. About weBBrainys: Features and Design Choices! 126
6.5.1. Home Page and Registration Process! 126
6.5.2. Personal Profiles and Friendship Management! 128
6.5.3. Usersʼ Blog ! 130
6.5.4. Making onesʼ Reputation Posting and Voting Blog Articles! 131
6.5.5. Keeping Track of Reputations and Braincells! 138
7. Conclusion, Limitations and Further Researches! 140
7.1. Webbrainys Results! 141
7.2. RCE Limitations of Applications! 142




1.0 Web2.0 defining elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
1.1 YouTube.com: an example of collective intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   21
2.0 A social network is a way of classify people according to social bonds of different nature  . . . .  25
2.1 Linkedin personal profile example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
2.2 World map of social networks popularity around the world  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
3.0 Social networking is not only changing the way companies deal with partners and customers but 
also the way they organize themselves  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   35
3.1 An example of social network represented by a graph structure. Imaged Retrieved from, 
Southeast Missouri State University website, link: http://cstl.semo.edu/institute/2009summer/
socialnetworking/. Original picture from: http://www.fmsasg.com/ , Sentinel Visualizer SNA tool 
(Copyright © FMS Inc.)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
3.2 Degree Centrality Example. Original picture from: http://www.fmsasg.com , Sentinel Visualizer 
SNA tool (Copyright © FMS Inc.)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   43
3.3 Betweenness Centrality Example. Original picture from: http://www.fmsasg.com , Sentinel 
Visualizer SNA tool (Copyright © FMS Inc.)  . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
3.4 Closeness Example. Original picture from: http://www.fmsasg.com , Sentinel Visualizer SNA tool 
(Copyright © FMS Inc.)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
3.5 Eigenvalue Example. Original picture from: http://www.fmsasg.com , Sentinel Visualizer SNA tool 
(Copyright © FMS Inc.)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
3.6 Hub and Authority Example. Original picture from: http://www.fmsasg.com , Sentinel Visualizer 
SNA tool (Copyright © FMS Inc.)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   47
4.0 Reputation Based Systems are used to establish trust among members of on-line communities 
where parties with no prior knowledge of each other use the feedback from their peers to assess the 
trust worthiness of the peers in the community. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.1 eBay tracking mechanism for past transactions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
5.0 RCE = Bridging User Generated Content Evaluation with Community Members Evaluation . .  75
5.1 Approval Votes Example (Class Resource pseudocode)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
5.2 Approval Votes Example (Class Resource pseudocode usage examples)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.3 RCE Meta-Model (Class Object representation)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  103
5.4 RCE Procedure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  106
5.5 RCE Procedure pseudocode (STEP0)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  106
5.6 UGC final weighted score calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.7 RCE Procedure pseudocode (STEP2)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107
5.8 RCE Procedure pseudocode (STEP3)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108
5.9 - Coumulative-Rep calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  109
5.10 - Reputation calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.0 - weBBrainys logo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
6
6.1 - weBBrainys Approval Procedure pseudocode . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.2 - weBBrainys Posts final weighted score calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  116
6.3 - weBBrainys Proficiency Factor calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.4 - weBBrainys Postʼ Owner points calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  117
6.5 - weBBrainys Postʼ Owner points calculation (visual explanation)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.6 - weBBrainys Postʼ Voter points calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  118
6.7 - weBBrainys Postʼ Voter points calculation (visual explanation)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.8 - weBBrainys Total Brain-Cells calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .120
6.9 - weBBrainys Reputation calculation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.10 - weBBrainys.com, Home Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  126
6.11 - weBBrainys.com, Registration Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.12 - weBBrainys.com, User Profile Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.13 - weBBrainys.com, info boxes editor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  129
6.14 - weBBrainys.com, Friend Request Email . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  129
6.15 - weBBrainys.com, friendship management tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  130
6.16 - weBBrainys.com, userʼs blog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130  
6.17 - weBBrainys.com, posts editor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  131
6.18 - weBBrainys.com, pending post (Home Page) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.19 - weBBrainys.com, pending post email notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  133
6.20 - weBBrainys.com, post example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   133
6.21 - weBBrainys.com, on the left a classical star-based rating panel, on the right weBBrainysʼ 
braincells rating panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  134
6.22 - weBBrainys.com, braincells rating panel after approval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  135
6.23 - weBBrainys.com, Post ownerʼs approval email report example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  135
6.24 - weBBrainys.com, Post votersʼ approval email report example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  137
6.25 - weBBrainys.com, Userʼs statistics management tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  138
6.26 - weBBrainys.com, various usersʼ statistics example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  139
7.1 - weBBrainys testing results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  142
7.2 - RCE implications of research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  143
7
DEDICATION
To my future wife Ksenija
for her warmth and support, although we were thousands of miles apart
and
to my Family
for  instilling in me courage of convictions
8
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I must thank first my advisor, Professor Gaetano A. Lanzarone, who although concerned 
by my decision of pursuing my Ph.D. in an almost unexplored field, was always on my side 
with the decision of pursuing research that gives me joy. 
I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee, Professor 
Elena Ferrari, Dr. Rosario Sica and Ing. Antonio Tomarchio.
Elena Ferrari certainly provided me a model to emulate. She was tenacious with her 
questions, precise with her research and unwavering in her support. I would not have had 
the same view without her guidance.
Rosario Sica provided me an insight in the world of business, which helped me in 
matching my research with real-world practical problems that sometimes are 
underestimated in academical works.
Antonio Tomarchio is an exceptional person and an invaluable partner in technology 
transfer to the industry. Confrontation with him always gives me that extra inspiration. He is 
the example of the business man who knows about research and cares to bring its 
benefits to the people. Iʼm grateful to him for having firmly supported my ideas.
I would also like to thank Professor Carla Simone for the good advice at the right moment, 
they were invaluable to the success of this work.
I must thank also Simbologica s.r.l. and itʼs owner, Marcon Giuseppe, which since the 
beginning have provided some of the physical facilities I needed to perform practical tests. 
Finally, I wish to give heartfelt thanks to my family, for their abiding support, dedication and 




Current technology has disappointed many members of WEB2.0 communities by its slow 
and tough adaptability to specific usersʼ skills and competences. Most of the largest 
WEB2.0 communities rely on the work of their members to create the resources they are 
built on, a business model known under the acronym UGC (User Generated Contents), 
which is today very popular yet still very simple and immature. Presently the vast majority 
of the communities that relay on UGCs lack an accurate ranking system for their most 
proficient members and almost none of them provide an effective rewarding mechanism. 
Sometimes they do provide means to cooperatively evaluate and classify the available 
resources, but very few of these mechanisms take in account the competence of the 
voters. 
Although rough, the current technology seems sufficient to confer to some cooperative 
web  communities a discrete success, which for the most part is due to their core-members 
passion and commitment. Unfortunately deficiencies like the ones described can involve 
that, over time, only a small amount of the members keep  committed and willing to 
produce resources of a certain quality. This tendency leads to the situation in which, 
although the community grows in terms of numbers, in proportion its value decreases.
Considering the fast diffusion of web2.0 communities and the new emerging Enterprise2.0 
communities phenomena, this problem needs no longer to be underestimated. 2.0 
communities should start thinking about new means to raise their quality standards in 
order to stay effective and successful over time. 
Providing communities with concrete rewarding systems like remunerative ones could fix 
the problem, nevertheless this approach rarely and loosely has been implemented so far. 
The reason is that the task involves several and not trivial side problems, such as the 
necessity of an advanced ranking mechanisms to evaluate the members. 
This method should be able to consider complex factors like competence and 
commitment, but at the same time it should be easily understandable and shared by the 
members of the community. In order to make sure that the members share and agree with 
the rating system it must involve their collaboration, which is a non trivial problem, 
especially in Entrprise2.0 communities.
For the aforementioned reasons I propose as a means to overcome the problem a method 
based on reputation rather than competence and commitment, which is named Reputation 
Community Evaluation (RCE). This new approach is not based solely on quantitative 
measurements but relies on an algorithm which exploits the community member 
reputations to evaluate the resources and the members themselves.  In this method the 
reputation of the single member grows or decreases according to its activity in the 
community and the evaluations received from the other members over a certain period of 
time. All members opinions/votes are themselves weighted accordingly to the single 
member reputation. This approach makes possible to put in place new kinds of business 




This work is logically divided in two main blocks. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 summarize the basic 
knowledge needed to understand the background on which RCE rely on. The subsequent 
chapters focus on current Reputation Systems analysis, RCE description, implementation 
and comparison over the existing technology.
In particular, chapter 4 aims to define what reputation is about and how it translates in an 
online environment, laying out the problems in reputation theory and discussing the 
lessons we can learn from existing models.
The chapter is itself logically divided in four parts.
Part one is about Reputation, Reputation System and the reasons why Reputation 
Systems are today more than ever before important and why online reputation is not by 
any means a less effective kind of reputation. 
Part two is dedicated to a functional classification of current online reputation systems 
considering some concrete examples in the main application fields and their technical 
aspects.
Part three is dedicated to the costs of reputation. Reputation entails costs: if you make it 
hard to provide reputation information people will not bother, whereas if you reward them 
in some way they will give more information. 
Reputation systems also motivate people in ways similar to monetary economies. 
Reputation can be earned, spent and traded; that is why in economics they talk of 
"economy of reputation". 
On these bases it will be demonstrated that since reputation is worth money. Any online 
system that is equipped with reputation systems can benefit from a raise in its value. 
Part four generalizes some of the issues and presents some of the solutions (even if 
partial) in current reputation systems, concluding that any robust online reputation system 
should take into account:
1. The type of feedback information that is collected in order to evaluate reputation 
(i.e. consider the right type of reputation system according to the problem to 
solve).
2. The form in which information feedbacks are distributed and represented (e.g. 
aggregated, complete history, time-windowed, etc.);
3. the interaction between psuedonymity and the economics of reputation (e.g. the 
relationship between reputation costs and reputation rewards).
4. The role of the reputation system in providing incentives for the provision of 
honest and accurate feedback information (e.g. introducing payment schemes);
5. And finally what algorithms can (or better theoretically could) guarantee the 
robustness of such a system (i.e. eliciting the right amount of feedback at the right 
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time, eliciting truthful feedback and preventing strategic manipulation by 
participants).
Chapter 4 ends concluding that despite the many theoretical and practical problems with 
current online reputation systems it is possible to try to improve the situation by exploiting 
the latest findings in research and the experience gained from a variety of real systems, 
like eBay or Amazon. 
In particular we can conclude that social and economical incentives influence 
reputation systems design criteria in ways that  a purely  technological discussion do 
not consider, and that in a future in which reputation systems will play a more important 
role in any online identity management solution (2, Resnick et Al., 2000), this aspect will become 
crucial.
In Chapter 5 the focus is on Reputation Community Evaluation (RCE), a new type of 
reputation metric or reputation evaluation model tailored for the needs of digital 
communities which rely on User Generated Contents (UGC).
Since, at the present, the vast majority of digital communities are WEB-based, the chapter 
opens classifying them according to three main factors: the presence of User Generated 
Contents, the existence of a Rating System for evaluating the UGCs and the use of an 
explicit Reputation System for ranking UGCsʼ  producers. According to this classification 
the RCE meta-model will be derived and explained detailing differences, possible 
scenarios of application and benefits over the existing solutions. 
The chapter closes with examples on how an RCE approach can concretely exploit the 
“economy of reputation” using reputation as a social currency in order to improve digital 
communities standards of quality and remain successful over time. 
Any good methodology needs to be proven applicable, therefore Chapter 6 describes how 
exploiting the RCE meta-model has been developed on a concrete case-study RCE 
system: weBBrainys.com.
The first part of the sixth chapter is about weBBrainys design choices and the way they 
were crafted around the RCE principles described in chapter 5. The second part describes 
system features, technological aspects and development methodologies.
Chapter 7 summarizes results achieved so far and includes further implications of 
research. 
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1. About WEB2.0: Present, Past and Future
Fig.1.0 - Web2.0 defining elements.
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1.1. Introduction
Web  2.0 is how the experts nowadays call the World Wide Web. Although the term is 
becoming more and more commonly used just a few people understand what actually the 
2.0 stands for. 
Chapter one has two major aims. Firstly, to make the point of the current situation 
clarifying the main differences between Web  and its 2.0 version, and secondly to take a 
peek to the future of Web: the so called Web 3.0 also known as the Semantic Web.
In order to better understand Web2.0 concepts such as Collective Intelligence, User 
generated Content and Collaborative Filtering will be explained.  Knowledge of these 
terms is needed in order to fully understand the way Reputation Community Evaluation, 
that is the central topic of this thesis, exploits the Web  2.0 main ʻfeaturesʼ and why it marks 
one step forward to the next iteration of the Web.
 
1.2.WEB2.0: The Official Definition 
The term "Web  2.0" first became notable after the O'Reilly Media Web  2.0 conference in 
2004.[I] It describes the changing trends in the use of World Wide Web technology and 
web  design that aim to enhance creativity, communications, secure information sharing, 
collaboration and functionality of the web. 
Although the term suggests a new version of the World Wide Web, it does not refer to an 
update to any technical specifications, but rather to changes in the ways software 
developers and end-users utilize the Web, which led to the birth of social-networking sites, 
video sharing sites, wikis, blogs, folksonomies, etc...
According to Tim O'Reilly [II] WEB2.0 is: 
“Web 2.0 is the business revolution in the computer industry caused by the move to 
the Internet as a platform, and an attempt to understand the rules for success on 
that new platform ”  [III]
--Tim O'Reilly
Although the OʼReilly definition is the official one it is not enough to completely describe 
what the Web2.0 is. It does not make explicit several aspects of this complex phenomenon 
which are worth to be mentioned. In this attempt, in the next chapter, there will be 
compared the most relevant aspects of “Web1.0” against  the “Web2.0” counterparts.
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1.3.Web1.0 v.s Web2.0!
Are we sure about what Web1.0 means? We have been using the web  for several years 
now, and the answer should hence be obvious. The very short answer is: “Web  1.0 refers 
to the state of the World Wide Web, before the 'bursting of the dot-com bubble' in 2001 [IV] 
”.  This definition is true and compact but not completely satisfactory. It is indeed not banal 
to tell what Web1.0 is. It is easier to formulate a description of the term when it is used in 
relation to the term Web 2.0, comparing the two with examples of each.
Professor Terry Flew, [V] in his 3rd Edition of New Media [VI] described what he believed to 
characterize the differences between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 like such:
"Move from personal websites to blogs and blog site aggregation, from publishing 
to participation, from web content as the outcome of large up-front investment to an 
ongoing and interactive process, and from content management systems to links 
based on tagging (folksonomy)" 
--Terry Flew
Flew describes the shift from Web 1.0 to Web 2.0 as a direct result of the change in the 
behavior of those who use the World Wide Web. 
Web  1.0 trends included worries over privacy concerns resulting in a one-way flow of 
information, through websites which contained 'read-only' material. 
On the contrary  in Web 2.0 days, the use of the Web can be characterized as the 
decentralization of website content, which is now generated from the 'bottom-up', 
with many users being contributors and producers of information.
Technological refinements also helped the shift from Web1.0 to Web2.0. These days 
dynamically generated blogs and social networking profiles, such as Myspace[VII] and 
Facebook[VIII], are more popular, allowing for readers to comment on posts in a way that 
was not available during Web 1.0 . Technological refinements also involved the Internet 
infrastructure.
At the Technet Summit in November 2006, Reed Hastings [IX], founder and CEO  of Netflix 
[X], stated a simple formula for defining the phases of the Web:
“ Web 1.0 was dial-up, 50K average bandwidth, Web 2.0 is an average 1 megabit of 
bandwidth and Web 3.0 will be 10 megabits of bandwidth all the time, which will be 
the full video Web, and that will feel like Web 3.0. ”
--Reed Hastings
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Design criteria were revisited as well. Some typical design elements of a Web1.0 site 
include:
1. Static pages instead of dynamic user-generated content.
2. The use of framesets.
3. Proprietary HTML extensions such as the <blink> and <marquee> tags 
introduced during the “first browser war”. [XI]
4. Online guestbooks.
5. GIF buttons, promoting web browsers and other products.[XII]
6. HTML forms sent via email. A user would fill in a form, and upon clicking submit 
their email client would attempt to send an email containing the form's details.[XIII]
According to Andrew McAfee[XIV] who coined the acronym “S.L.A.T.E.S”, Web  2.0 
websites typically include some of the following features:
! “Search: the ease of finding information through keyword search which makes the 
platform valuable. 
! Links (Dynamic Links): links are guides to important pieces of !in format ion. The 
best pages are the ones most frequently linked to. Googles search paradigm exploits 
correctly this assertion to index informations ʻscatteredʼ around the web. A links structure 
that changes over the time reflects the opinions of many people. In Web  1.0 sites links are 
prevalently made by web developers, in Web  2.0 links can be  edited by users 
dynamically.
! Authoring: the ability to create constantly updating content over a platform that is 
shifted from being the creation of a few to being a constantly updated interlinked work. In 
wikis, the content is iterative in the sense that the people undo and redo each other's work. 
In blogs, content is cumulative in that posts and comments of individuals are accumulated 
over time.
! Tags: categorization of content by creating tags that are simple, one-word 
descriptions to facilitate searching and avoid rigid, pre-made categories.
! Extensions: automation of some of the work and pattern matching by using 
algorithms e.g. amazon.com recommendations.
16
! Signals: the use of RSS (Really Simple Syndication) technology to notify users with 
any changes of the content by sending e-mails to them.” [XV]
As a rule of thumb  we can assert that Web 2.0 sites allow users to do more than just 
retrieve information. They can provide "Network as platform" computing [see chapter 1.4], 
allowing users to run software-applications entirely through a browser. They feature a rich, 
and user friendly interface which can be based on technologies such as: Ajax [XVI], Flex 
[XVII] or similarly rich media.
1.4.  Why WEB2.0 is not a New Technology?
The Web2.0 as introduced in the last part of the previous chapter may sound like a 
complex and continually evolving technology, which includes server-software, content-
syndication, messaging-protocols, etc... 
However it is a matter of fact that Web2.0 sites have capabilities that go beyond 
what are in Web1.0 ones and it is logical for people to think about Web2.0 as new 
technology  but, Tim Berners-Lee[XVIII], the inventor of the World Wide Web does not 
agree with this definition.
Berners-Lee has questioned whether one can use the term Web  2.0 in any meaningful 
way[XIX]. The reason is that many of the technological components of  Web2.0 have 
actually existed since the early days of the Web.
Barners-Lee is not wrong, the shift from Web  1.0 to Web  2.0 can be seen just as a result 
of technological improvements on different levels: "broadband connections, improved 
browsers, Ajax, Flash application platforms, etc..."
On the other hand Web2.0 sites have an "Architecture of Participation"[see next chapter] that 
encourages users to add value to the application as they use it. This stands in contrast to 
very old traditional websites, which limit visitors to viewing content that only the owner 
could modify. 
We can state, then, that Web2.0 is best defined as a change in the ways users utilize 
the Web, rather than a new technology. 
Nevertheless we must recognize that this change has been possible thanks to 
technological improvements which have, in time, enhanced confidence and awareness of 
the World Wide Web capabilities in its users. 
In the end we can say that the concept behind the Web2.0 can be summarized as 
“The Web as participation platform” [see next chapter] , opposed to the Web1.0, ”The Web 
as information source” .
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1.5.Web2.0: The Web as Participation Platform
Andrew McAfeeʼs[XIV] definition of Web2.0 websites characteristics (S.L.A.T.E.S) [Chapter 1.2] 
appears now to be lacking. We can complete them with the definition of David Best. 
According to Bestʼs paper [XX], the essential attributes of Web2.0 are: 
1. Rich User Experience: through technologies such as AJAX, Flex etc... Web 2.0 
applications can achieve some of the characteristics of desktop applications.
2. User Participation, the platform is used by the users not only as an information 
source, but they have an active role in the applications, as they do forums, 
comments, wiki etc...  
3. Dynamic Generated Content: the structure of the application encourages users 
to add contents as they use it.
4. Metadata [XXI],
5. Web Standards and Scalability [XXII],
6. Openness and Freedom [XXIV].
And also in many cases Collective intelligence  [Chapter 1.4.1] by way of user participation 




“Collective intelligence is a shared or group  intelligence that emerges from the 
collaboration and competition of many individuals.”
The above definition has emerged from the writings of Peter Russell (1983), Tom Atlee 
(1993), Pierre Lévy (1994), Howard Bloom (1995), Francis Heylighen (1995), Douglas 
Engelbart, Cliff Joslyn, Ron Dembo, Gottfried Mayer-Kress (2003) and other theorists. 
Collective intelligence appears in a wide variety of forms, like in bacteria, animals, 
humans, and can also be defined as a form of networking enabled by the rise of 
communications technology and the Internet. 
According to Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams [XXI], authors of the book ʻwikinomicsʼ, 
collective intelligence can be seen as a form of mass collaboration, which can happen in 
presence of specific factors like: openness, peering and sharing.
Openness
During the early ages of communication technology people and companies were reluctant 
to share ideas and intellectual property, but rather encourage self-motivation. The reason 
for this is that these resources provide the edge over competitors. Now people and 
companies tend to loosen hold over these resources because they reap more benefits in 
doing so, like gaining significant improvement and scrutiny through collaboration.
Peering
This is a form of horizontal organization. One example is the Linux OS program where 
users are free to modify and develop  it provided that they made it available for others. 
Participants in this form of collective intelligence have different motivations for contributing, 
but the results achieved are for the improvement of a product or service. 
Sharing
Is a fact that Web  2.0 has enabled, or at least greatly improved, interactivity. As a 
consequence web users are able to generate and share their own content to enhance the 
pool of existing knowledge on the internet (see user generated contents [Chapter 1.4.2]).
Considering openness, peering and sharing, we can say that collective intelligence in 
communications technology, and particularly in the web, is certainly a human enterprise 
in which, a willingness to share, and an openness for the common good are 
paramount. Therefore it is obviously not a mere quantitative contribution of 
information from all ʻactorsʼ, it  is also a qualitative process. As a matter of fact 
individuals who respect collective intelligence are confident of their own abilities but 
recognize that the whole is greater than the sum of individual parts.
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Unfortunately not everything is perfect and there are some criticisms, especially about  the 
reliability of user generated contents.
1.5.2. User Generated Contents (UGC)
The new media are often associated with the promotion and enhancement of collective 
intelligence, allowing the storage and retrieval of information without difficulty. This 
happens predominantly through databases and the Internet which promotes online 
interaction and distribution of knowledge between users and sources, resulting in a form of 
collective intelligence.
Web collective intelligence is often confused with shared knowledge. The former is 
knowledge that  is generally  available to all members of a community, whilst the 
latter is information known by  all members of a community. For this reason Web 
Collective intelligence has less user engagement than Collaborative Intelligence, 
which involves shared knowledge.
As an example, the most spread mechanism in the Web to evaluate user generated 
contents are ʻplainʼ voting methods. There are various examples of this mechanism on 
the internet, a very popular one is the web-tv YouTube.com.
In web  sites equipped with a ʻplainʼ voting system users simply express their preferences 
giving a numerical vote to the resources according to their will. The sum of the votes is 
than averaged in a final score, giving thus the value of that resource. 
Although the method clearly has the potential to converge many unique perspectives in a 
common opinion, there are no means to evaluate the users competence or influence, 
hence this uninformed voting is to some degree random and thus leaves only a residue of 
informed consensus. 
Critics point out that often bad ideas, misunderstandings, and misconceptions are widely 
held, and that the structuring of the decision process must favor experts who are 
presumably less prone to random or misinformed voting in a given context. 
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One major complaint is about the general quality of user generated contents (UGC). For 
instance, about web  news and blogging, there are those who fear that they are not up  to 
par with the quality produced by formally trained writers and hence UGCs are contributing 
to the decline of standards in publishing. Such complaints show a misunderstanding of the 
nature of UGC creations. There is undeniably a long tail of user-generated content that 
ranges from low to high, however, grammatically correct and compellingly written work is 
not necessarily substantive, honest or true and vice-versa.
Major questions these days are: What and who can then be considered reliable in the 
internet environment? Are there any means to certify, in a shared way the reputations of 
contributors and quality of resources? 
This does not seem to be an easy task. Lately, the research community is lately trying to 
better understand the problem and finding means to solve it. The major aims of 
Reputation Community Evaluation (RCE) is right to move a step in this direction.
Before closing chapter 1 Collaborative Filtering is worth a mention too. 
1.5.3. (Active) Collaborative Filtering (CF)
Collaborative Filtering (CF) is a technique not specifically aimed to evaluate contents 
quality or users reputation but still is worth the mention because  some of the problems in 
this field are similar to the ones in Reputation Community Evaluation. We can therefore 
use some of the results achieved in Collaborative Filtering to derive sensible informations. 
Fig.1.1 - YouTube.com : an example of collective intelligence 
exploited in order to evaluate user generated contents.
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CF is also worth the mention to better understand the differences in between 
Collaborative Filtering and Reputation Community Evaluation, which may be confused.
Collaborative filtering (CF) is the process of filtering for information or patterns using 
techniques involving collaboration among multiple agents, viewpoints, data sources, users 
etc. 
Often in the web this method is applied in making automatic predictions (filtering) about the 
interests of a user by collecting taste information from many other users (collaborating).
Applications of collaborative filtering typically involve very large data sets which are used 
to perform the following two steps:
1. Look for users who share the same rating patterns with the active user (the user 
whom the prediction is for).
2. Use the ratings from those like-minded users found in step  1 to calculate a 
prediction for the active user.
For example, a collaborative filtering or recommendation system for music tastes could 
make predictions about which music a user should like given a partial list of that user's 
tastes (likes or dislikes). Note that these predictions are specific to the user, but use 
information gathered from many  users. This differs from the simpler approach of 
giving an average (non-specific) score for each item of interest, for example based 
on its number of votes.
Alternatively, item-based collaborative filtering popularized by Amazon.com (users who 
bought x also bought y) , proceeds in an item-centric manner:
1. Build an item-item matrix determining relationships between pairs of items
2. Use the matrix, and the data on the current user to infer his taste.
Another form of collaborative filtering can be based on implicit observations of normal user 
behavior. In these systems you observe what a user has done together with what all users 
have done (what music they have listened to, what items they have bought) and use that 
data to predict the user's behavior in the future or to predict how a user might like to 
behave if only they were given a chance. 
On the net there is a certain amount of sites that implement collaborative filtering systems. 
Among the most notable are:
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Amazon.com - web store






There are, though, some disadvantages in using collaborative filtering. The most relevant 
one is that if you want to rely on usersʼ  opinions you have to accept the fact that they may 
be biased. This happens for instance using ratings methods, which directly exploit the 
votes in order to generate the recommendations. In this case the problem is usually 
mitigated using a lot of votes, which statistically lower the risk. 
This solution is not always possible. Some items may have just few ratings, especially if an 
item is new in the system (The Cold Start Problem), and in this case there is no concrete 
solution yet. Nevertheless, in the next chapters we will see that Reputation Community 
Evaluation, in certain circumstances, can provide means to address this type of problem.
These types of problems are typical of the Web  2.0, finding new solutions means moving 
toward the next step in this technology: the Web 3.0. 
1.6.What the future looks like? - Introducing WEB3.0
“Web2.0 is Just a Piece of Jargon!” -- This was the “creative” but not completely wrong 
definition of the Web  2.0. of Tim Berners-Lee [XVIII], in an interview for the magazine 
ZdNet.com. 
A passage from the famous interview:
ZdNet Interviewer: “You know, with Web 2.0, a common explanation out there is Web 1.0 
was about connecting computers and making information available; and Web 2.0 is about 
connecting people and facilitating new kinds of collaboration.   Is that how you see Web 
2.0?”
BERNERS-LEE:   “Totally not.   Web 1.0 was all about connecting people.   It was an 
interactive space, and I think Web 2.0 is of course a piece of jargon, nobody even 
knows what it means.   If Web 2.0 for you is blogs and wikis, then that is people to 
people.  But that was what the Web was supposed to be all along.”
The question now is if Web 3.0 is doomed to be a piece of Jargon too.
Previously in this chapter we reported what Reed Hastings [IX] in 2006 had to say about:
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“ Web 1.0 was dial-up, 50K average bandwidth, Web 2.0 is an average 1 megabit of 
bandwidth and Web 3.0 will be 10 megabits of bandwidth all the time, which will be 
the full video Web, and that will feel like Web 3.0. ”
--Reed Hastings
This definition sounds realistic but at the same time reduces the Web  3.0 to a mere 
technical improvement once again. Therefore for the final users Web  3.0 may actually 
sound like ʻjust a piece of Jargon 3.0ʼ.
Before, in May 2006, Tim Berners-Lee [XVIII]  was saying about Web 3.0:
« People keep asking what  Web 3.0 is. I think maybe when you have got an overlay 
of Scalable Vector Graphics on Web 2.0 - today  everything rippling and folding and 
looking misty  - and access to a semantic Web integrated across a huge space of 
data, you will have access to an unbelievable data resource »
--Tim Berners-Lee
Berners-Lee not only proposes the Web  3.0 as a more beautiful and brutally powerful web, 
but also as  “The intelligent Web”, a semantic web, capable of natural language search, 
using data mining , machine learning, and artificial intelligence technologies.
This latter definition emphasizes machine-facilitated understanding of information in order 
to provide a more productive and intuitive user experience and describes a Web 3.0 which 
is much more than a mere “piece of Jargon 3.0”.
Skeptics point out that ʻThe Intelligent Webʼ  has yet to come and it may be a longer than 
expected way to go.
As a matter of fact it seems more likely that the next ʻiterationʼ of the web  will be a mix of 
machine-facilitated services through intelligent systems in the sense that they will be 
capable to better the web  but still via the web  users intelligence. For instance finding more 
effective mechanisms to improve quality of user generated contents, accuracy in 
collaborative filtering etc... 
Reputation Community Evaluation approach moves right toward this latter direction.
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2. WEB 2.0 Communities are Social Networks
Fig.2.0 - A social network is a way to classify people according 
to social bonds of different nature (familiar, working, etc...) 
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2.1. Introduction
Social Network Services (SNS) are an emerging phenomenon of the Web  2.0 which is 
changing the way Web users interact with each other and access the net itself.
The amount of Social Network Services spreading the Web  is by now very relevant and 
variegated, it is therefore very complicated to define an exact taxonomy. This chapter 
proposes a classification which considers social network services according to three main 
aspects: accessibility, type of service, and business model. Such classification will be 
very useful in following chapters in which will be proposed new kinds of business models 
that Reputation Community  Evaluation approach, making applicable to certain types of 
SNS.
2.2.Social Networks as Web Services
A social network is simply any group  of people which are connected by social bonds of a 
different nature such as familiar, business, friendship etc...
The study of social networks is often used as a support for intercultural researches as in 
sociology and anthropology, and more recently it is expanding in internet and intranet 
contexts in the form of Social Network Analysis,[See Chapter3] thanks to the advent of the Web 
2.0 and Enterprise 2.0 especially [See Chapter 3]. 
The Web 2.0 idea of social network was first born in the U.S.A. to spread the whole world 
whole and become one of the most evolved forms of communication.
The typical internet social network is intended as a service, so we can talk rather than 
internet social network of social network services. These services focus on building 
online communities of people who share interests and/or activities, or who are interested in 
exploring the interests and activities of others. 
Early social networking websites started in the form of generalized online communities 
such as The WELL [XXII] (1985), Theglobe.com  [XXIII] (1994) and Tripod.com [XXIV] (1995).
These early communities focused on bringing people together to interact with each other 
through chat rooms or simply having people linked to each other via email addresses, and 
share personal information and ideas around any topics via personal homepage publishing 
tools which was a precursor to the blogging platforms. 
Between 2002 and 2004, three major social networking services emerged as the most 
popular in the world, causing such sites to become part of mainstream users globally. 
First there was Friendster [XXV], then, MySpace [VII], and finally, 2004 saw the emergence of 
Facebook [VIII], a competitor, also rapidly growing in size but limited at first to the US 
college environment. In 2006, Facebook opened up to the non US college community 
spreading all over the world and showing, clearly, that social networking was about to 
become one of the major components of business internet strategy. Today social 
networking websites are being used regularly by millions of people.
26
2.3.The way Social Networking Services Work
Typically social networking services require users to create a profile for themselves, 
providing information such as an email address, a profile picture, some details about 
personal interests, life, working experiences, skills, etc. 
Social Networks users can often be "friends" with other users too. This feature relys on the 
convention that both users must confirm that they are friends before they are linked. For 
example, if user A lists user B  as a friend, then user B would have to approve user Aʼs 
friend request before they are listed as friends.
Social networks usually have some sort of privacy controls that allows for instance the 
user to choose who can view their profile or contact them, etc... .
Some social networks have additional features, such as the ability to create groups that 
share common interests or affiliations, upload photo albums, upload or stream live videos, 
and hold discussions in forums. 
Fig.2.1 - An example of userʼs personal profile taken from linkedin.com 
[XXVI]
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2.4.Social Networking Services Categories
2.4.1. Internal and External Social Networking Services
Social Networking Services can be divided into two big categories: internal social 
networking (ISN) and external social networking (ESN).
An ISN is a closed/private community that usually consists of a group  of people within a 
company, association, society, education provider and organization or even an "invite only" 
group.
ESN's can be specialized communities (i.e. Linked, business oriented ESN) or they can be 
generic social networking sites sites such as MySpace, Facebook, Twitter [XXVII] which are 
open/public and available to all web users. 
However, whether ISN or ESN, whether specialized or generic there is a commonality 
across the general approach of social networking sites. 
Social Networking Services have been developed especially in two main areas: 
Friendship/Communication (i.e. MySpace, Facebook, Twitter etc..) and lately Business, in 
which ISN and ESN are the new hot topic.
2.4.2. Business and B2B ESN
One popular example of ESN being used for business purposes is LinkedIn.com which 
simply aims to interconnect professionals on an online network.
LinkedIn is free to join and within a few years has become the most successful business 
ESN on the in internet with over 43 million users in over 200 countries.
When the users join, they can create a profile that summarizes his/her professional 
expertise and accomplishments. The user can then form enduring connections by inviting 
trusted contacts to join LinkedIn and connect to you. Your network consists of your 
connections, your connectionsʼ connections, and the people they know, linking you to a 
vast number of professionals and experts. 
Through your LinkedIn network you can:
1. Manage the information that is publicly available about you as professional
2. Find and be introduced to potential clients, service providers, and subject experts 
who come recommended
3. Create and collaborate on projects, gather data, share files and solve problems
4. Be found for business opportunities and find potential partners
5. Gain new insights from discussions with like-minded professionals in private group 
settings
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6. Discover inside connections that can help you land jobs and close deals
7. Post and distribute job listings to find the best talent for your company
Business Social networks like linkedIn connect people at a very low cost, and can be very 
valuable not only to single users but also for entrepreneurs and companies looking to 
expand their contact base. 
These networks often act as a customer relationship  management tool for companies 
selling products and services. For instance, companies have found that social networking 
sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, are great ways to build their brand image. 
Since some companies operate globally, they can also use social networks to make it 
easier to keep in touch with contacts around the world.
One more popular use for this new technology is social networking between businesses. 
We can conclude that there are at least six major uses for businesses and social media:
1. To create Brand Awareness
2. Can be used as an online reputation management tool
3. For Recruiting
4. Can be used to learn more about new technologies and competitors
5. Can be used as a tool to intercept potential prospects
6. B2B relationships management 
It is then clear that the use of social network services, in an enterprise context, presents 
the potential of having a major impact on the world of business and work. This new trend is 
pushing companies not only to invest money and effort in ESN but also to invest in their 
own ISN, completely dedicated to the benefit of the company itself, like, to better 
production processes and to foster communication among employees. This new trend has 
recently emerged with the name of Enterprise 2.0 [See Chapter 3].
2.4.3. ESN and ISN Side Application Domains
Science IES and ESN
One other use of Social Networks is in the Science communities. 
Social networking allow scientific groups of any kind to expand their knowledge base and 
share ideas in faster and more flexible ways, avoiding the risk that some sensible 
resources might become isolated and hence irrelevant.
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As an example, biotechnology firms are starting to use social networking sites to share 
scientific knowledge, in order to increase their flexibility in ways that would not be possible 
within a self-contained hierarchical organization [XXVIII].
Educational IES and ESN
The National School Boards Association[XXIX] reports that almost 60 percent of students 
who use social networking talk about education topics online and, surprisingly, more than 
50 percent talk specifically about schoolwork.
Social networks focused on supporting relationships between teachers and between 
teachers and their students are now used for learning, educator professional development, 
and content sharing. 
Learncentral.org is an example of this trend of ESN sites built to foster relationships that 
include educational blogs, formal and ad hoc communities, chats, discussion threads, and 
synchronous forums. In some cases these sites also have content sharing and simple 
rating features for the shared contents.
Governance ESN
Social networking is more recently being used by various government agencies. Social 
networking tools serve as a quick and easy way for the government to get the opinion of 
the public and the keep  the public updated on their activity. As an example NASA has 
taken advantage of a few social networking tools, including Twitter and Flickr [XXX]. They 
are using these tools to aid the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee, 
whose goal it is to ensure that the nation is on a vigorous and sustainable path to 
achieving its boldest aspirations in space.
Medical ESN
Social networks are beginning to be adopted by healthcare professionals as a means to 
manage institutional knowledge, disseminate peer to peer knowledge and to highlight 
individual physicians and institutions. 
A new trend is emerging with social networks created to help  its members with various 
physical and mental ailments. 
For people suffering from life altering diseases, PatientsLikeMe [XXXI] offers its members the 
chance to connect with others dealing with similar issues and research patient data related 
to their condition. 
For alcoholics and addicts, SoberCircle.com gives people in recovery the ability to 
communicate with one another and strengthen their recovery through the encouragement 
of others who can relate to their situation. 




Online dating ESN are social networks in the sense that users create profiles to meet and 
communicate with others, but their activities on such sites are for the sole purpose of 
finding a person of interest to date. An important difference between social networks and 
dating services is the fact that online dating sites usually require a fee, where social 
networks are free. This difference made this kind of ESN very profitable. Presently the 
online dating industry is seeing a massive decrease in revenue. As a matter of fact many 
use friendship  oriented social networking services for similar purposes, without paying any 
fees. 
Very popular online dating services are Match.com, Yahoo Personals, and eHarmony.com.
2.5.Social Networks Services Business Models
Dating social Networks usually apply a business model that is fee based, but currently just 
few social networks charge money for membership. In part, this may be because social 
networking is a relatively new service, and the value of using them has not been firmly 
established in customers' minds.
Companies such as MySpace and Facebook have online advertising on their site, so they 
are seeking large memberships, and charging for membership  would be 
counterproductive. 
Social networks operate under a business model in which a social network's members 
serve dual roles as both the suppliers and the consumers of content. This is in contrast to 
a traditional business model, where the suppliers and consumers are distinct agents. 
Revenue is typically gained via advertisements, but subscription-based revenue is 
possible when membership and content levels are sufficiently high.
As an example LinkedIn.com is free to join but they also offer premium accounts that give 
you more tools for finding and reaching the right people, whether or not they are in your 
network.
Several social networks in Asian markets such as India, China, Japan and Korea have 
reached not only a high usage but also a high level of profitability. Services such as 
QQ.com (China), Mixi.jp  (Japan), Cyworld.com (Korea) or the mobile-focused service 
Mobile Game Town by the company DeNA.jp  in Japan (which has over 10 million users) 
are all profitable, setting them apart from their western counterparts.
Another business model is the ʻPrize Based Rewarding Systemʼ, which applies usually on 
social networks relying on some form of users generated contents, such as blogging 
platforms. In this business model revenue comes from the advertising inside the site, and 
most active users are rewarded with prices according to their performances which are 
evaluated on some quantitative criteria, such as number of posts a month, number of 
comments etc.
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The latest evolution in the social networks business model is to give for free the 
membership to the service but having inside the website ads plus some sort of 
marketplace where to buy, usually, digital contents like music or movies. This last business 
model applies to social networks like lastfm.com or musicovery.com, which gather together 
people who like to share their passion for music with others.
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2.6.World Map of popularity of social networks 
around the world [Fig.2.2, XXXIII]
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2.7.  S2W: The Evolution of Social Networking 
Services
Social networking services are not only rapidly evolving in the way they are doing business 
but also in their technological aspects.
The most relevant emerging phenomenon related to Social Networking Services is about 
the so called socio-semantic web (S2W). S2W aims to complement the formal Semantic 
Web  vision by adding a pragmatic approach relying on description languages for semantic 
browsing using heuristic classification and semiotic ontologies.
The socio-semantic web  opens up  for a more social interface in which humans are 
collaboratively building semantics aided by socio-semantic information systems.
An early example of this new approach is the Semantic Social Network like the famous 
StumbleUpon. These services represent a hybrid in between a web  social network and a 
resource aggregator via collaborative filtering [See Chapter 1]. 
StumbleUpon allows its users to discover and rate Web  pages, photos, and videos, 
through a personalized recommendation engine that works via a special rating badge that 
people can embed in their web  pages, the official website (stumbleupon.com) or preferably 
via a specific web  browsers plugin. The user clicks the "Stumble!" button on the browser's 
toolbar and StumbleUpon chooses which Web  page to display based on the user's ratings 
of previous pages, ratings by his/her friends, and by the ratings of users with similar 
interests. 
Social Networking Services latest tendency is to spread from the web  into Enterprises, in 
order to enhance the way they are doing business. It is the Enterprise 2.0 phenomenon to 
which next chapter is dedicated.
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3. Enterprise 2.0: Web 2.0 Goes Business?
Fig.3.0 - Social Networking is not only changing the way 
companies deal with partners and customers but also the way 
they organize themselves. 
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3.1. Introduction
Internet Social Network Services are powerful tools for quickly reaching and connecting 
the masses. As a result, Social Networks are becoming more and more important for 
organizations to intercept their target markets. 
In the future, while we might see some B2B organizations create their own online 
communities, social networking will become not an option but a necessity to understand 
the needs and wants of their prospects and clients.
Social Networking is not only changing the way companies deal with partners and 
customers but also the way they organize themselves, including social and networking 
modifications to corporate intranets and other classic software platforms. This new trend in 
Enterprise Software is known as Enterprise Social Software, which is a major 
component of the so called Enterprise 2.0.
Chapter 3 aims to describe the characteristics and the state of Enterprise 2.0, which is 
undoubtedly connected with Web2.0 but, at the same time, has distinctive features that 
add technological and infrastructural approaches to the original Web 2.0 concept. Among 
the latest and most relevant there is Enterprise Social Network Analysis (SNA), a tool for 
investigating Enterprise2.0 communities.
The knowledge of the basics about Enterprise 2.0 and SNA is necessary to fully 
understand in following chapters the way Reputation Community  Evaluation (RCE) 
could be used in Enterprise 2.0 System to improve their efficacy through innovative 
approaches to accomplish Enterprise Social Network Analysis.
3.2.About Enterprise 2.0: History and Definitions
Enterprise 2.0 was named after Web 2.0 and has lately become a catchier term used to 
describe social and networking changes to enterprises, which often includes social 
software too.
Enterprise 2.0 was defined in many ways; a very compact definition comes from a report 
written for the Association for Information and Image Management (AIIM) [XXXIV]:
"Enterprise 2.0 is a system of web-based technologies that provide rapid and agile 
collaboration, information sharing, emergence and integration capabilities in the extended 
enterprise"  [XXXV] 
A much more elaborated and complete definition of Enterprise 2.0 comes from 
Andrew McAfee [XIV], professor of Harvard Business School, which first defined it in the 
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paper “Enterprise 2.0: The Dawn of Emergent Collaboration”, published by MIT Sloan 
Management Review. [XV]
After the paper publication McAfee was not completely satisfied with his first definition and 
through his blog proposed a refined one [XXXVI]: 
“ I am not satisfied with my earlier definition of Enterprise 2.0, so letʼs propose a 
refinement (Iʼm sorry if this feels a bit pedantic, but clear constructs are important to 
academics):
Enterprise 2.0  is the use of emergent social software platforms within companies, or 
between companies and their partners or customers.
Social software enables people to rendezvous, connect or collaborate through computer-
mediated communication and to form online communities.
Platforms are digital environments in which contributions and interactions are globally 
visible and persistent over time.
Emergent means that the software is freeform, and that it contains mechanisms to let the 
patterns and structure inherent in peopleʼs interactions become visible over time.
Freeform means that the software is most or all of the following:
1. Optional
2. Free of up-front workflow
3. Egalitarian, or indifferent to formal organizational identities
4. Accepting of many types of data ” 
Recently another very interesting definition came from the Enterprise 2.0 Observatory of 
School of Management of Politecnico di Milano [XXXVII], which  defines the Enterprise 2.0 as 
a dramatic change in the assets of companies , and summarizes its three major elements:
1. Usage Web 2.0 collaborative tools,
2. Presence of adaptive architecture (SOA & BPM) [see chapter 3.3],
3. Usage of technology as a platform to realize the so called “Virtual 
Workspace” [XXXVIII].
What is very interesting to observe in this latest definition is that Web 2.0 collaborative 
tools are just one part of the Enterprise 2.0. It is then straightforward to observe that 
Enterprise 2.0, although inspired by Web  2.0 principles, is lately taking on its very own 
identity. 
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3.3.Enterprise 2.0: Why Not Just Web 2.0 behind 
firewalls?
From the technological point of view, according to the official definitions, Enterprise 2.0 




4. Social bookmarking for tagging
5. Feed RSS,
6. Social Networking Tools,
7. Etc...
But, according to studies like the ones carried out by The Enterprise 2.0 Observatory 
previously mentioned, Enterprise 2.0 is taking its own path, adding new technological and 
infrastructural approaches such as:
8. Collaborative planning software for peer-based project planning and 
management.
9. Prediction markets for forecasting and identifying risks.
10. Service-oriented architecture (SOA). In a business domain, SOA defines a set 
of principles that allows different applications to exchange data with one another.
11. Business Process Management (BPM). A management approach that promotes 
business effectiveness and efficiency while striving for innovation, flexibility, and 
integration with technology.
Enterprise 2.0 is a phenomenon still in evolution and only future years will clearly define its 
characteristics. Meanwhile, researchers are trying to identify the minimum set of 
functionalities that a social software for an enterprise must have to work well. Among them, 
Andrew McAfee, in 2006, was proposing as the minimum set the followings [XV]:
1. Search: allowing users to search for other users or content.
2. Links: grouping similar users or content together.
3. Authoring: including blogs and wikis.
4. Tags: allowing users to tag content.
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5. Extensions: recommendations of users; or content based on profile.
6. Signals: allowing people to subscribe to users or content with RSS feeds.
In 2007 Dion Hinchcliffe [XXXIX] expanded the list by adding the following four functions [XL] :
1. Freeform function: no barriers to authorship  (meaning free from a learning curve 
or from restrictions).
2. Network-oriented function: requiring web-addressable content in all cases.
3. Social function: stressing transparency (to access), diversity (in content and 
community members) and openness (to structure).
4. Emergence function: requiring the provision of approaches that detect and 
leverage the collective wisdom of the community.
For the near future, considering the increasing interest and the consequent fast 
development of Enterprise 2.0, it is very likely that this list will expand.
3.4.Why Enterprise 2.0 has become an appealing 
reality? 
Blogs, wikis, and RSS feeds have been around since the 1990s, and technologies such as 
the popular AJAX [XVI] since the early years of this decade, why then has Enterprise 2.0 
become an appealing reality just now?
It is not because of any recent technology breakthrough. Technology is certainly one of the 
reasons, but focusing just on this component is misleading. We can find an answer in what 
McAfee defines as the three basic trends that converging have changed the relationship 
between those who offer technologies and those who use them.  
According to McAfee, the trends [XXXVI] are :
1) Simple, Free Platforms for Self-Expression
For about a decade companies have been providing users around the world with free 
Web-based communication channels like email and instant messaging, but the information 
exchanged via these channels is not persistently visible, so it is not consultable.
The birth of free blogs was a big change.   With five minutes of effort anyone can build 
themselves a worldwide platform for self-expression using text, audio, photos or videos.
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2) Emergent Structures, Rather than Imposed Ones.
As an example McAfee cites Yahoo!. In the early years of its existence Yahoo attempted to 
organize the Webʼs content hierarchically, placing individual sites into pre-defined 
categories like Health, Arts, and Computers, and into sub-categories within them. 
The company employed taxonomists to create and update this structure.  Taxonomy is the 
science of classifying things, usually hierarchically.  Taxonomies are developed by experts, 
and then rolled out to users to help  them make sense of the world and relate things to 
each other.
At a certain point the Web was becoming too big and growing too fast for the taxonomists 
to keep  up  with and it became more productive to enter free text into Google than to 
navigate through Yahooʼs hierarchy.
Web  categorization schemes were out of date for several years, until the advent of 
services like del.icio.us[XLI], which is based not on an up-front  taxonomy developed by 
experts, but instead on a ʻfolksonomyʼ [XLII][XLII],   a categorization system developed over 
time by folk.
3) Order from Chaos. 
If everyone were starting blogging, making edits at Wikipedia, and uploading photos to 
Flickr, isnʼt chaos the inevitable result? 
Amazingly the answer is NO. This is because in addition to building platforms for self-
expression and overcoming their previous tendencies to impose structure there have been 
tools developed that help us filter, sort, prioritize, and generally stay on top  of the flood of 
new online content.
These tools include powerful search, tags (the basis for the folksonomies), and automatic 
RSS signals whenever new content appears.  
In its last analysis, Enterprise 2.0 has become an appealing reality just recently  because 
of new ways of interacting between the existing technology and the end users. An 
evolution that clearly has lot in common with the passage from ʻWeb1.0ʼ to Web2.0. 
There are nonetheless things that completely set Enterprise 2.0 apart from Web 2.0. Some 
of these, as we have seen, are structural. The others are new trends and technical 
improvements. Among the latter, an emerging phenomenon is certainly the Enterprise 
Social Network Analysis (SNA).  
Enterprise SNA, which will be defined in the next chapter, is lately becoming more and 
more important as an Enterprise 2.0 tool. It is especially worthy of mention because, as it 
will be explained in chapter 7, Reputation Community  Evaluation Systems, if used in 
conjunction with SNA, could lead to a new methodology to accomplish Enterprise Social 
Network Analysis.
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3.5.Social Network Analysis: Investigating 
Enterprise 2.0 Communities
Social Network Analysis (SNA) exploits a mathematical formalism that involves the use of 
the theory of graphs in order to represent and then analyze a social networks structure. 
This technique consists of various means of mapping and then measuring the network in 
order to infer sensible information from it.
In Social Network Analysis a social structure is represented with nodes (which are 
generally individuals or organizations) that are tied by one or more specific types of 
interdependency, such as values, visions, ideas, financial exchange, friendship, sexual 
relationships, kinship, dislike, conflict or trade.
In the image below (Fig 3.1) an example of social network represented by a graph 
structure.
Analyzing fig. 3.1, from a visual standpoint, some clusters are certainly visible, but the 
density of information makes it difficult to see all the centrality aspects. 
Fig.3.1 - An example of social network represented by a graph structure 
(Copyright © FMS Inc.).
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Using Social Network Analysis, you can get answers to questions like:
1. How highly connected is an entity within a network?
2. What is an entity's overall importance in a network?
3. How central is an entity within a network?
4. How does information flow within a network?
In this respect SNA provides a set of methodologies and formulas for calculating a variety 
of criteria that map  and measure the links between things. Some of them will be discussed 
with concrete examples in the next chapter taken from real world tools examples. 
Following some example that has been taken from the specifications of a tool called 
Sentinel Visualizer (Copyright © FMS Inc.) .
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3.6.SNA Metrics and Examples
3.6.1. Degree Centrality
Degree centrality is simply the number of direct relationships that an entity has.  An entity 
with high degree centrality:
1. Is generally an active player in the network.
2. Is often a connector or hub in the network.
3. Is not necessarily the most connected entity in the network (an entity may have a 
large number of relationships, the majority of which point to low-level entities).
4. May be in an advantaged position in the network.
5. May have alternative avenues to satisfy organizational needs, and consequently 
may be less dependent on other individuals.
6. Can often be identified as third parties or deal makers.
In the example-image above (Fig 3.2) Alice has the highest degree centrality (number of 
arches, representing direct relationships), which means that she is quite active in the 
network. However, she is not necessarily the most powerful person because she is only 
directly connected within one degree to people in her clique and she has to go through 
Rafael to get to other cliques.
Fig.3.2 - Degree Centrality Example. 
(Copyright © FMS Inc.)
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3.6.2. Betweenness Centrality
Betweenness centrality identifies an entity's position within a network in terms of its ability 
to make connections to other pairs or groups in a network. An entity with a high 
betweenness centrality generally:
1. Holds a favored or powerful position in the network.
2. Represents a single point of failure. Take the single betweenness spanner out of a 
network and you sever ties between cliques.
3. Has a greater amount of influence over what happens in a network
In the example above (Fig.3.3), Rafael has the highest betweenness because he is 
between Alice and Aldo, who are between other entities. Alice and Aldo have a slightly 
lower betweenness because they are essentially only between their own cliques. 
Therefore, although Alice has a higher degree centrality, Rafael has more importance in 
the network in certain respects.
Fig.3.3 - Betweenness Centrality Example.
(Copyright © FMS Inc.)
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3.6.3. Closeness
Closeness centrality measures how quickly an entity can access more entities in a 
network. An entity with a high closeness centrality generally:
1. Has quick access to other entities in a network.
2. Has a short path to other entities.
3. Is close to other entities.
4. Has high visibility as to what is happening in the network.
As with the betweenness example, Rafael has the highest closeness centrality because he 
can reach more entities through shorter paths. As such, Rafael's placement allows him to 
connect to entities in his own clique, and to entities that span cliques.
Fig.3.4 - Closeness Example.
(Copyright © FMS Inc.)
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3.6.4. Eigenvalue
Eigenvalue measures how close an entity is to other highly close entities within a network. 
In other words, Eigenvalue identifies the most central entities in terms of the global or 
overall makeup of the network. A high Eigenvalue generally:
1. Indicates an actor that is more central to the main pattern of distances among all 
entities.
2. Is a reasonable measure of one aspect of centrality in terms of positional 
advantage.
In this example, we can see that Alice and Rafael are closer to other highly close entities in 
the network. Bob and Frederica are also highly close, but to a lesser value.
Fig.3.5 - Eigenvalue Example.
(Copyright © FMS Inc.)
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3.6.5. Hub and Authority
If an entity has a high number of relationships pointing to it, it has a high authority value, 
and generally:
1. Is a knowledge or organizational authority within a domain.
2. Acts as definitive source of information.
Hubs are entities that point to a relatively large number of authorities. They are essentially 
the mutually reinforcing analogues to authorities. Authorities point to high hubs. Hubs point 
to high authorities. You cannot have one without the other.
Fig.3.6 - Hub and Authority Example.
(Copyright © FMS Inc.)
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3.7.SNA: Conclusions
There are some other possible measurements beyond the few ones proposed in chapter 
3.6. Recent studies involve finding new ones and the most meaningful way to interpret 
them. Besides all of these different approaches we can classify them into two major 
groups: Direct/Subjective and Indirect/Objective.
Direct/Subjective are the ones in which the Social Network Model is built upon using data 
collected directly with surveys. This represents the most straightforward way, but has a big 
drawback: it can be biased by personal opinions or insincere answers.
The second type is the Indirect/Objective method, which thanks to the advent of Enterprise 
2.0 and Social Networking Tools is becoming more and more popular. 
With the Indirect/Objective method the Social Network Model is built by collecting data 
observing the intranet network and the behavior of its members, like: who they email more 
often, which parts of the network they access, which parts they do not access, etc... 
The method is obviously not biased by personal opinions or insincere answers but can be 
less effective than the former. Personal opinions, according to the type of investigation we 
are accomplishing, may matter.
In certain cases it would be nice to have a method able to collect indirectly personal 
opinions and balancing them with the community knowledge, avoiding thus the problem of 
biased or insincere answers. As it will be explained in chapter 7 Reputation Community 
Evaluation (RCE), in conjunction with SNA, may be used in this way.
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4.About Reputation and Online Reputation Based 
Systems
Fig.4.0 - Reputation Based Systems are used to establish trust among 
members of on-line communities where parties with no prior knowledge of 
each other use the feedback from their peers to assess the trust 
worthiness of the peers in the community.
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4.1. Introduction
Reputation is about what you do, what you say, and above all what other people say about 
you. This latter aspect implies reputation to be partially biased by peoplesʼ specific points 
of view. Reputation evaluation is therefore, by the very nature of reputation itself, a very 
complicated task. 
Reputation Based Systems try to accomplish this task to the best that current technology 
can, in the effort of automating traditional word-of-mouth reputation and to the aim of 
complementing the new opportunities provided by electronics markets such as eBay  and 
Amazon. Nevertheless, just tying to mime in an online context the same situations we are 
all familiar with reputation in the physical world would introduce some pitfalls.
The internet provides us with a great amount of data about preferences, behavior patterns, 
and other details all theoretically very useful to build a good reputation system but, to 
make them concretely exploitable we need to find ways to use these data without naively 
believing in their quality.
Unfortunately, the field of reputation research is still young, and there are no clear 
technological solutions (1, Dingledine et al., 2003), now or on the horizon. 
Chapter 4 aims is to explain how reputation translates in an online environment, laying out 
the problems in reputation theory and discussing the lessons we can learn from existing 
models.
This chapter is logically divided in four parts. Part one defines the concept of Reputation 
and Reputation System, exploring also the reasons why reputation Systems are today 
more than ever before important and why online reputation is not a less effective kind of 
reputation and, on the contrary, if well managed it has the potential to be even more 
effective. 
Part two classifies online reputation systems according to functional and technical features 
considering ʻreal lifeʼ examples.
Part three is dedicated to the costs of reputation. Reputation entails costs, therefore if it is 
hard to provide reputation information people won't bother, whereas if you reward them in 
some way they will give more information. 
Reputation systems also motivate people in ways similar to monetary economies. 
Reputation can be earned, spent, and traded; thatʼs why in economics they talk of 
"economy of reputation". On these bases it will be demonstrated that since reputation is 
worth money any online system that is equipped with reputation systems can benefit of a 
raise in its value. 
Part four generalizes some of the issues and presents some of the current solutions (even 
if partial) in current reputation systems, concluding that any robust online reputation 
system should take in account:
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1. The type of feedback information that is collected in order to evaluate reputation 
(i.e. consider the right type of reputation system according to the problem to 
solve).
2. The form in which information feedbacks are distributed and represented (e.g. 
aggregated, complete history, time-windowed, etc...).
3. the interaction between psuedonymity and the economics of reputation (e.g. the 
relationship between reputation costs and reputation rewards).
4. The role of the reputation system in providing incentives for the provision of 
honest and accurate feedback information (e.g. introducing payment schemes).
5. And finally what algorithms can (or better theoretically could) guarantee the 
robustness of such a system (i.e. eliciting the right amount of feedback at the right 
time, eliciting truthful feedback and preventing strategic manipulation by 
participants).
Chapter 4 conclusions are that despite the many theoretical and practical problems with 
current online reputation systems it is possible to try to improve the situation by exploiting 
the latest findings in research (even though they are based on simplified models) and the 
experience gained from a variety of real systems, like eBay or Amazon. In particular, in a 
future in which reputation systems will play a more important role in any online identity 
management solution (2, Resnick et Al., 2000), social and economical incentives will influence 
reputation systems design criteria in ways that contemporary  approaches don't 
consider.
4.2.About Reputation and Reputation Systems
The first aspect to be considered about reputation is that although by personal experience 
we all have an idea of what reputation means, this idea is often partial and doesnʼt cover 
all the complexity that reputation involves.
A ʻpocketʼ definition comes from  Wikipedia: 
"Reputation is the opinion (more technically, a social evaluation) of the public toward a 
person, a group of people, or an organization. its influence ranges from competitive 
settings, like markets, to cooperative ones, like firms, organizations, institutions and 
communities. It is an important factor in many fields, such as business, online communities 
etc..." 
In particular, when we talk of reputation in online communities we are talking of Reputation 
Systems, which are systems that attempt to attach reputation to an identity, in order to 
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make an ongoing assessment of that reputation by automating word-of-mouth reputation (2, 
Resnick et Al., 2000).
At the base of any Reputation System there is linkability, that is the ability of linking actions 
to an identity, and then to make predictions about the identity's future actions (1, Dingledine et al., 
2003). 
Reputation and linkability are fundamental in environments in which there is asymmetric 
information. Newspapers are a good example. A reader must pay for the good before 
evaluating the good, and the seller and publisher likely have better information about the 
quality of the product. 
Without the ability to brand a product like newspapers, that is the ability to link the product 
to a reputation, the newspaper market would likely  end up  with quality products unable to 
differentiate themselves from low quality products and only low quality products surviving 
in the long-term (3, Akerlof, 1970).
4.2.1. The Reasons Why Reputation Systems are so 
Important
What is so important about reputation is that whether it is online or offline it is always a big 
part of individuals identity. Reputation systems are therefore relevant because by 
exploiting reputation they attempt to better define the identity of the peers. It is clear then 
that every system that makes a point of safety in peersʼ identity should consider 
implementing some sort of reputation system. 
A fundamental reading about the topic is “A Crowd of One: The Future of Individual 
Identity”  (2007), by John H. Clippinger, Co-Director of  The Law Lab at Harvard University. 
Following are some excerpt from his book where he writes about reputation systems:
"Reputation systems are an especially important aspect of social cooperation because 
they are attached to an individual and form the basis for whether they can be trusted and 
accepted. A reputation is really  the collection of tags that are assigned to an 
individual or entity  to reflect assessments of their competence or status within a 
specific social network. ...
In eBay, for example, a seller acquires a reputation score given to them by their buyers. 
Different reputation score levels not only make it more likely that others will do business 
with them, but it confers a certain status among other members of the eBay community. To 
encourage participation, many  online games depend upon accumulated scores, 
levels, roles and ratings of players. So do many peer production undertakings such as 
Wikipedia, Slashdot and open source software development. ...
It is not difficult to see how important reputation tags are in small traditional societies 
where once a reputation is acquired, it may be very difficult to change. Honor-based 
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societies depend upon reputation tags as the principal governance mechanism for defining 
and enforcing a social order. "Honor killings" of a daughter or sister in order to preserve a 
familiar reputation suggest the power of reputation in Human Nature. Even in online 
communities, reputation tags are the motivator and governor of behaviors. People take 
seriously the reputation scores of an eBay  seller/buyer, the accumulated scores of a 
player of online games, or the number of friends and ratings one has in the online 
social networks of Linkedin, Friendster, Facebook, or My Space.
Identity is not something that can be self-defined. It is granted and modulated by one's 
roles, relationships, and reputations in a variety of social networks. One's identity 
(whether it be an individual person, group or organization) is closely  tied to 
reputation tags and roles in social networks. How you see yourself depends upon 
how other see and rate you.
Reputation tags affect an individual or group's ability  to participate within and 
across different networks, thereby  becoming the basis for granting/revoking certain 
privilege and decision rights."
About online reputation systems there are also experiments that confirm their undeniable 
value. As an example Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels  in  “How Effective Are Electronic 
Reputation Mechanisms?” (2003) utilized a two-stage game where in a simulated 
eMarketplace buyers decide whether to send money, and sellers then decide whether to 
ship  the item. The conclusions are that in the reputation condition where subjects were 
informed of each otherʼs past play, trust and trustworthiness increased as compared to a 
no reputation condition.
Assumed that Reputation Systems have an effective influence even in online context, yet 
another relevant aspect to be evaluated is if online reputation systems could be inherently 
useless simply because online reputation is a less effective kind of reputation.
4.2.2. Is Online Reputation a Less Effective Kind of 
Reputation?
Online reputations are built in ways in which parties with no prior knowledge of each other 
use the feedback from their peers to assess the trust they have in the other peers. The 
lack of personal knowledge and sometimes of community ties, clearly can affect the 
effectiveness of some Online Reputation Systems, involving some reliability issues. This 
could lead to question whether or not online reputation is something obsolete and should 
be substituted with different solutions. In the recent work, “Is reputation obsolete?” (5) , 
Judith Donath answers a clear no to the topic. 
Following are some excerpts of the most significant parts of her paper.
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"... Through discussion about othersʼ actions, people establish and learn about the 
communityʼs standards. Reputation is the core of rewards and sanctioning – it amplifies 
the benefits of behaving well and the costs of misbehavior. If I work with someone 
who turns out to be lazy and dishonest, by telling my friends about it, they are spared from 
a similar bad experience. Having access to reputation information is a big benefit of 
community membership: insiders know who to trust and how to act toward each other, 
while strangers do not get the benefit of otherʼs past experiences... In light of this, it would 
seem that the answer to the question “Is reputation obsolete?” is “No”....
Reputation information exchanged within close-knit communities is more reliable, and 
members learn when assessments are biased. A colleague recently mentioned that she 
would never trust another recommendation letter from Professor X again – sheʼd seen too 
many in which he claimed that different students were “the top scholar Iʼve known”. In 
overzealously promoting the careers of his students, Professor X acquired a poor 
reputation for inflated praising. Most letter writers temper the desire to over-enthusiastically 
praise in order to remain credible in the eyes of their peers, realizing that this close-knit 
community assesses the assessors. Without community ties, reputation is generally 
less useful...
So, is reputation obsolete in an increasingly archival world? The answer, it appears, is 
“sometimes”. When the immediate facts are primary, we should make use of the vast 
amount of archived material available. But when situations are ambiguous, when there are 
conflicting versions of events or codes of behavior, and when developing a shared culture 
is important (Merry 1997), reputation and the communicative, community-building process 
of creating it is far from obsolete...
Your reputation is information about you, but it is not by you. If you own your own 
words, then your reputation is owned not by you, but by the people who talk about you. 
Furthermore, it is a subjective judgment made it a specific context that may not translate 
well into another. History is portable in ways that reputation is not... 
In technologically mediated societies, evaluating the relative merits of history and 
reputation is especially important, for the habits of such communities are shaped by 
deliberate design." 
It is a fact that Internet is ʻboostingʼ the field of Reputation Evaluation and Reputation 
Systems are changing the way reputation is managed and formed, it is also undeniable 
that Online Reputation Systems have sometimes disadvantages. For example on public 
rating sites such as eBay, where no community binds the rater and the reader of ratings, 
there is no check on reliability and the ratings function primarily as a social exchange 
between the rater and subject (6, David & Pinch, 2006). As a matter of fact as Donath states 
“without  community  ties, reputation is generally less useful”, nevertheless since she 
states also “reputation amplifies the benefits of behaving well and the costs of 
misbehavior”, reputation should play a fundamental role even in online environments, 
even more, there are undeniable online-only advantages. 
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In this respect, Lucio Picci, senior scientist for the European Commission and Associate 
Professor Department of Economics of University of Bologna, whose field of research 
consist in Reputation-based Governance, states that Internet innovates reputation 
systems in three major ways, in a summary of his research works for the Journal First 
Monday (7, Lucio Picci, 2007) :
“Firstly, it allows to spread voice–of–mouth to an unprecedented level. This, in turn, 
permits the existence of reputation–based interactions — be them of the market type, or 
other — at a global level and among persons many degrees of separation apart.
Secondly, the presence of a digital information infrastructure allows for a careful 
engineering of many details that contribute to the overall outcome of the system, such as: 
The condition under which the assessments are made, the metric according to which they 
aggregate to form a reputation index, the rules for participating and the possibility of 
changing oneʼs identity, etc.
Thirdly, the Internet democratizes reputation systems, because it allows for their design 
so that all relevant parties may play the game under similar conditions. In conventional 
contexts information on reputation mostly spreads informally and via social networks: 
people who are better placed within them are at an advantage because they obtain better 
information. This, in turn, creates an incentive to spend time and resources to place 
oneself within such advantaged networks, a socially wasteful activity that economists 
would define as “rent seeking” 
In conclusion, online reputation is not by any means inferior to conventional reputation. On 
the contrary, it has the potential to be more effective and with a larger social impact. The 
obvious precondition is that the reputation systems chosen for the task are up  to it.  It is 
then necessary to investigate what current technology can offer us in terms of reputation 
systems and reputation metrics.
4.3.  Online Reputation Systems and Reputation 
Metrics
As discussed in the previous chapter the process of filtering information to distill a smaller 
yet more refined set of usable, verified, trustworthy judgments is not easy, but is both more 
feasible and more necessary now than ever before, due to pressing socio-economic 
problems, technological advances and information proliferation, especially online.
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According to TrustLet (www.trustlet.org), a collaborative project for the scientific research 
of trust metrics on social networks, classifies the current major trust metrics in:
1. Local or Global.
2. Content Driven or Ratings Driven.
Which are currently applied in five major fields:
1. Peer to Peer File Exchange.
2. Internet Pages Ranking.
3. E-Commerce 
4. Recommender Systems
5. Wiki edits, Spam Filtering of email, etc...
Current researches explore the possibility of applying trust and trust metrics in new fields 
of application. In this respect, web-based social networks look promising. Among the latest 
works “Computing and applying trust in Web-based social networks” (11, Golbeck, J. A., 
2005) and “Inferring binary trust relationships in Web-based social networks” (12, Golbeck, 
J. A. and Hendler, J. 2006) there are present solutions to determine how much one person in a 
Web-based network should trust other people to whom he is not directly connected. 
4.3.1. Local vs. Global Trust Metrics: What is Trust and 
what is Reputation?
A local trust metric predicts trust scores that are personalized from the point of view of 
every single user. For example a local trust metric might predict "Alice should trust Carol 
as 0.9" and "Bob  should trust Carol as 0.1", or more formally trust(A,C)=0.9 and trust(B,C)
=0.1
Local trust metrics start from the assumption that every single trust statement is an equally 
worthy subjective opinion and that there are no wrong opinions and that there are no 
global reputation values on which all the users must agree. 
On the other hand, a global trust metric computes a single global trust value for every 
single user.
There are obviously reasons of using a local trust metric rather than a global one and vice 
versa. 
Local trust metrics are particularly useful in order to avoid that the opinion of the majority 
exclusively drive the community (tyranny of the majority), however they might suffer from 
the risk that the user can lose the point of view of the community at large and relying just 
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on the opinions of few trusted users, which may invalidate the relevance of being part of a 
community itself.
Usually the choice between local or global trust metrics is a choice between computing 
reputation or trust. The concept of reputation is certainly closely linked to that of 
trustworthiness, and their differences have been extensively studied (8, Jøsang et Al., 2007), 
nevertheless the fundamental difference for the purposes of this thesis is that reputation is 
a quantity derived from the underlying social network which is globally visible to all 
members of the network. Trust usually involves private knowledge about the trustee, e.g. 
through direct experience or a relationship. Often these factors are more important of any 
reputation that a person might have. So a person could  trust you because of your good 
reputation or trust you despite your bad reputation (8).
In the absence of personal experience, like in online environments, trust often has to be 
based on referrals from others or can be derived from a combination of received referrals 
and personal experience.
Reputation is also addressed as Objective Trust. In reality trust cannot be defined 
objectively, simply because every person is free to express a different level of trust in the 
other. For this reason, it is better to use the term "reputation" when referring to an 
aggregated value computed by a global trust metric trying to represent what the 
community as a whole thinks about a certain person or topic. 
Of course different global trust metrics can compute different values of reputation for every 
individual and so not even the reputation can be called "objective" but simply an 
aggregation of the subjective trusts computed according to the characteristics of the global 
trust metric (simple majority vote, average, propagation of trust on the social network, ...). 
Jøsang et Al. (8) describe the differences between trust and reputation systems as follow: 
1. “Trust systems produce a score that reflects the relying partyʼs subjective view of an 
entityʼs trustworthiness, whereas reputation systems produce an entityʼs (public) 
reputation score as seen by the whole community.”
2. “Secondly, transitivity is an explicit component in trust systems, whereas reputation 
systems usually only take transitivity implicitly into account.”
3. “Finally, trust systems usually take subjective and general measures of (reliability) 
trust as input, whereas information or ratings about specific (and objective) events, 
such as transactions, are used as input in reputation systems.”
There can of course be trust systems that incorporate elements of reputation systems 
and vice versa. The EigenTrust model (9, Kamvar et Al., 2003) is an example of hybrid solution. 
It computes peers reputation scores in P2P networks through repeated and iterative 
multiplication and aggregation of trust scores. Similarly PeerTrust (13, Xiong et Al., 2004), a 
reputation-based trust supporting framework, includes an adaptive trust model for 
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quantifying and comparing the trustworthiness of peers based on a transaction-based 
feedback system.
In final analysis it is not always clear whether a given systems should be classified as 
trust or reputation based, therefore the descriptions of the various trust and reputation 
systems that follow must be considered in light of this consideration.
4.3.2. Content-Driven Reputation Systems
Content Driven reputation is a metric suitable for collaborative web  environments, such as 
wikis. This kind of reputation systems are usually tested (though none of them are 
implemented) on Wikipedia, to determine the level of trust one can have in its authors  (an 
example: “A Content-Driven Reputation System for the Wikipedia” by Thomas Adler 
and Luca de Alfaro. WWW 2007 ). 
This type of reputation metrics generally works as follows. The reputation of the authors is 
computed according to how long their contributions last in the Wikipedia. Specifically, 
authors whose contributions are preserved, or built-upon, gain reputation; authors whose 
contributions are undone lose reputation.
The value of a given person's contributions can then be evaluated as the
product of Quantity of contributions (in characters of text and images uploaded) and 
Length of time the contributions remain posted.
Of course there are some problems with Content-Driven metrics. One major complaint is 
that if an article is undone it does not necessarily impliy a fault of the author, the situation 
may simply have changed and the article needs therefore a major update.
Yet another example of content driven reputation system is Page Rank used for web 
searching engines (15, Sergei Brin and Larry Page,1998).
In the 1990's, web  searching engines downloaded and catalogued millions of web pages. 
Engines responded to queries based on simple metrics, such as whether the page 
included the search phrase, and how many times a page included the search phrase.
Over time, people began "attacking" these search engines to steer visitors to their 
respective pages. People created pages with many common key words: if a page 
contained enough attractive words, search engines would be more likely to return it to 
users searching for that phrase. The attack was improved by creating many copies of a 
given page, thus increasing the likelihood that it would be returned.
In response to these attacks, and in hopes of developing more accurate search engines, 
researchers began evaluating alternative trust metrics for search engines. In 1998, 
Stanford researchers opened a new search engine, called Google, that uses reputation 
technology. Google's fundamental innovation is to determine a page's usefulness or page 
rank based on which pages link to it.
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Google's trust algorithm can be visualized as follows: Begin on the front page of a very 
popular website (e.g., Yahoo, CNN, Slashdot, etc.). Now randomly follow links from the 
front page for a few minutes. The page you end up on receives a small amount of 
reputation. Repeat this operation millions of times. Over time, pages which are commonly 
linked to will emerge as having higher reputation because they are "more connected" in 
the web. Pages on the borders of the WWW will have lower reputation because few other 
pages point at them. Sites which are linked from many different reputable websites will be 
ranked higher, as will sites linked from extremely popular websites (e.g. a direct link from 
the main Amazon page to an offsite page).
Though complex, Google's reputation-based scheme results in far better results to search 
queries than other search engines.
4.3.3. Ratings-Driven Reputation Systems
What makes the Wikipedia and Page Rank examples content-driven reputation systems is 
that the reputation is computed automatically via text analysis. 
This is contrasts with other reputation systems, such as Peer to Peer file exchange where 
computer based cooperative infrastructures are usually very automated systems but still 
require a little manual intervention in order to provide trust informations. 
Generally the reputation (trust) system in P2P networks follows four steps.
Step 1: a requestor r locates available resources sending a broadcast Query message to 
ask for the files it needs to download. Other peers will answer with a QueryHit message to 
the requesting node to notify that they have the requested resource.
Step 2: Upon receiving a set of QueryHit messages, r selects an offerer o and polls the 
community for any available reputation information on o sending a Poll message. As a 
result of step  2, r receives a set V of votes, some of which express a good opinion while 
others express a bad one.
step 3: reevaluates the votes to collapse any set of votes that may belong to a clique and 
explicitly selects a random set of votes for verifying their trustworthiness.
step 4: the set of reputations collected in step 3 is computed into an aggregated 
community-wide reputation value. Based on this reputation value, the requester r can take 
a decision on whether accessing the resource offered by o or not. After accessing the 
resource r can update its local trust depending on o whether the downloaded resource 
was satisfactory of not.
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Of course there can be some variation over the basic P2P model and research is 
constantly active in finding alternative solutions (9, 13).
Totally automated systems consider page view count or link count as an implicit trust data; 
other systems like P2P are just partially automated and require explicit users feedback. 
Among Systems belonging to the latter category Collaborative Filtering Systems [See chapter 
1.5.3] seems to be very similar to P2P and to Rating-Driven Reputation Based systems. As a 
matter of fact in some ways they are similar, for instance they both collect ratings from 
members in a community, nevertheless they also have fundamental differences. 
The assumptions behind Collaborative Filtering Systems is that different people have 
different tastes, and therefore rate things differently. If two users rate a set of items 
similarly, they share similar tastes. This must not be confused with reputation systems 
which are based on the opposite assumption, namely that all members in a community 
should judge the performance of a transaction partner or the quality of a product or service 
consistently.
People will for example judge data files containing film and music differently depending on 
their taste, but all users will judge files containing viruses to be bad. 
Collaborative Filtering systems can be used to select the preferred files in the former case, 
and reputation systems can be used to avoid the bad files in the latter case.
Another important point is that Collaborative Filtering Systems assume all participants to 
be trustworthy and sincere, i.e. to their job  as best they can and to always report their 
genuine opinion. Reputation Systems, on the other hand, assume that some participants 
will try to misrepresent the quality of services in order to make more profit, and to lie or 
provide misleading ratings in order to achieve some specific goal. 
It can be very useful to combine Collaborative Filtering and reputation systems. As an 
example in 2005 Avesani et Al. (10) proposed Moleskiing, a trust-enhanced recommender 
system application. Amazon.com also does this to a certain extent letting users rate each 
item, and using then this information to score the item and to tailor on single customer 
flavor advice concerning other products they may want to purchase. 
E-commerce website usually adopt soft implementations of Rating-Driven Reputation 
Systems, where users declare a feedback for each transaction and the reputation is then 
calculated using trust metric algorithm. A similar soft approach is often adopted by website 
that rely on User Generated Contents (e.g. YouTube, see chapter 1.5.2), where users are 
encouraged to rate other usersʼ contents.
An example of more ʻaggressiveʼ  usage of a Rating-Driven Reputation Systems is 
represented by eBay, which uses reputations at the heart of its online auction system for 
ranking buyer and seller honesty. 
Because buyers and sellers on eBay usually have never met each other, they need to 
decide whether or not to trust each other.
To help  them make the decision, eBay collects feedback about each eBay participant in 
the form of ratings and comments. After a trade, eBay users are encouraged to post 
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feedback about the trade and rate their trading partner. Good trades, in which the buyer 
and seller promptly exchange money for item, yield good feedback for both parties. Bad 
trades, in which one party fails to come through, yield bad feedback which goes into the 
eBay record. All this feedback can be seen by someone considering a trade.
The idea is that such information will lead to more good trades and fewer bad trades. As 
weʼll see this isn't always the case in practice, but it is often enough to give eBay a 
reputation of its own as the preeminent web auction site.
4.4.Reputation as a Social and a Real Capital
There are many sites with reputation systems of some sort. The eBay system is 
undoubtedly the biggest and best known, and is also a clear example of the economical 
implications that a reputation system can have in an online community. Reputation itself is 
in economy addressed as a social currency, a nice definition of social currency comes 
from the book ʻIdentity, Reputation, and Social Currency”, by John H. Clippinger.
! !
"A social currency is the reputation score an individual or entity acquires in a particular 
social network that credibly reflects their value in that network. For example, like a 
monetary currency, the value of a social currency may be set by the demand that an 
individual in a given social network can command, as in some kind of supply and demand 
calculation. Yet the calculation may also reflect a more subtle calculation of value based 
upon peer ratings of performance that cannot be captured in measures of supply and 
demand.
Different social networks have their own social currencies reflecting their reputation and 
membership rules. Highly proficient members of these networks - those who know how to 
truck, barter and exchange - can accumulate their own form of social capital - i.e., favors, 
obligations, goodwill. In many cases, they can convert one social currency into currencies 
in other social networks. For example, success in sports is often convertible to success in 
politics, business and entertainment. Likewise, social currencies accumulated in a 
business network are generally convertible into the currencies of social standing and 
political credibility. "
So reputation is considered in the economy as a currency in the sense that it has an 
INTANGIBLE VALUE yet CONCRETELY SPENDABLE and therefore can be considered 
exploitable at the level of every other type of economical capital. Even more, reputation 
has properties beyond the traditional capitals, it is: Secure and Transitive (Source: The 
Open Privacy Project ). 
Secure because reputations cannot be subverted, and the source of reputation assertions 
can always be traced, especially in online communities. Transitive because, as an 
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example, if A trusts B  as a source of local news, and B  trusts C for local news, then it could 
be determined that A trusts C for local news.
The economical implications of reputation in online systems have been in the last few 
years evaluated by a discrete number of theoretical studies and a fairly large number of 
empirical studies which for the most part involved the study of the effects of eBayʼs 
reputation system on sales (16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22). 
One of the most complete and recent empirical experiments is “The value of reputation 
on eBay: A controlled experiment.” (16, Resnick et Al., 2006) .
In this work the authors prove that eBay sellers with a higher reputation can on average 
affect buyersʼ  willingness-to-pay more till an 8.1% of the medium selling price of a certain 
type of good (in this case they were selling collectable postcards). They also consider 
other 15 similar papers, which in different circumstances and with different type of goods 
got to similar conclusion.
The relevance of these studies on eBay reputation systems lies in the fact that they 
demonstrate that a reputation system is able to affect the perception of the quality 
of the goods. An item associated with the reputation of a seller is more valuable 
than the same item not “tagged” with any  reputation information. So it is clear that a 
reputation system increases not only  the value of single items but also of the 
system as a whole. For instance an eBay  without any reputation system would be 
much less valuable than the current eBay, and likely less popular.
4.5.Problems and Solutions in Reputation Systems
From the eBay experiments it is clear that useful reputation mechanisms cannot and 
should not be designed without regards to the economics aspects that the task involve, but 
rather through a careful consideration of both the computational and incentive aspects. 
According to Roger Dingledine et Al. (1) the main design considerations for a reputation 
system should include: 
1. The type of feedback information that is collected in order to evaluate reputation 
(i.e. consider the right type of reputation system according to the problem to 
solve);
2. The role of the reputation system in providing incentives for the provision of 
honest and accurate feedback information (for example via payment schemes); 
3. The form of information feedback that is distributed (e.g. aggregated, complete 
history, time-windowed, etc.);
4. the interaction between psuedonymity and the economics of reputation; 
5. The robustness of a system against strategic manipulation by participants. 
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In the following subchapters tries a classification of main Reputation Systems problems 
and the solutions currently available, even if sometimes they are only partial.
4.5.1. Problem 1: Reputation Involves Costs and Needs 
Rewards
We have seen that if buyers are uncertain about seller trustworthiness, they will reward 
better seller reputations by raising their offers. At the same time we must consider also that 
it is costly to maintain a reputation for high quality, at least in time and effort, than a good 
reputation needs to be rewarded by at least the cost of building one. Similarly a bad 
reputation or a decline in reputation should incur a loss that exceeds the benefit from 
opportunistic behavior (18, Shapiro, 1983). Thus, in equilibrium, a good reputation must 
command a price premium. Therefore in eBay, since sellers who get negative feedback 
can start over relatively easily, buyers (or the system by default) should impose some 
disadvantage on sellers with no feedback at all (34, Friedman et Al., 2001). 
We should also expect that buyers will not provide information to help  determine seller 
reputations, since to do so incurs a cost (effort and/or time). Unfortunately free riding is 
hard to punish and for instance eBay reputation system doesnʼt do anything about that, so 
in practice it doesnʼt  represent the pure rational game-theoretic processes (Resnick and 
Zeckhauser, 2002).
4.5.2. Problem2: Avoiding Balance of Powers and 
Transferability of Reputation
In some rating based reputation systems it is to most raters' perceived advantage that 
everyone agrees with the rater. This is how chain letters, Amway, and Ponzi schemes (24, 
25) get their shills: they establish a system in which customers are motivated to recruit 
other customers. 
This issue with reputation systems is known as reputation transferability. 
Letʼs make an example. If a vendor offered to discount past purchases if enough future 
customers buy the same product, it would be hard to get honest ratings for that vendor. All 
the buyers, in order to foster new selling and get the discount, would rate the vendor very 
high. 
This example applies to all kinds of investments. Once you own an investment, it is not in 
your interest to rate it negatively. To mitigate the problem some propose to apply complete 
ubiquitous anonymity  to the rating system.  This would discourage alleys between buyer 
and sellers or,  unfortunately there are no reputation systems that currently work 
completely anonymously and remain safe (1, Dingledine et al., 2003). 
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As an example of badly managed balances of powers it can be considered once again 
eBay. The most striking feature about eBay feedback system is that it is so positive. 
Sellers receive negative feedbacks only 1% of the time, and buyers 2% (2, Resnick et Al., 2000). 
Nevertheless we must consider that buyers are in a less powerful position than sellers. 
This consequently leads to problems with leaving negative feedback, even when 
deserved, because of fear of an implicit threat of retaliation or the need to have to deal 
with other partyʼs reaction. The consequence is an artificial low rate of negative feedback 
and fraud (26, Ben Gross, Alessandro Acquisti, 2003).
In the years some improvements have been proposed to the eBay system  in order to 
mitigate the problem, like:
1. Seller provides the first feedback (26)
2. Blind Reviews (26)
3. Decouple service and feedback trust (27)
None of this solution is definitive but certainly they would improve the eBay system, 
nonetheless eBay still does not apply any of them. According to Ben Gross and 
Alessandro Acquisti (26) the reason is that eBay has convenience in appearing to provide a 
more trustworthy marketplace. The consequences are obvious: many undocumented 
frauds.
4.5.3. Problem 3: Fraud 
In this respect it is once again useful and interesting to consider some events that 
happened and are still happening at  eBay.com.
“In mid-2000, a group of people engaged in eBay auctions and behaved well. As a result, 
their trust ratings went up. Once their trust ratings were sufficiently high to engage in high-
value deals, the group suddenly ʻturned evil and cashed out.ʼ That is, they used their 
reputations to start auctions for high-priced items, received payment for those items, and 
then disappeared, leaving dozens of eBay users holding the bag.” (28)
This type of attack can be expanded from single entities to entire companies. As an 
example if a corporation planning a transaction of some millions, would decide to base its 
decisions on websites that computes and publishes reputations for companies a dishonest 
vendor might want to forge or use bribes to create good feedback to raise his resulting 
reputation. 
At eBay they tried to mitigate the “cash and run” problem with a tracking mechanism for 
past transactions that includes transactions details plus a textual description of the 
outcome of the trade by the buyer (Fig.4.1).
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Given the rarity of negative ratings in eBay system (below 1%), they should be much more 
consequential than positives in affecting a seller's overall reputation and the specifics of 
negatives should be much more informative (2, Resnick et Al., 2000).
However, eBay offers no search mechanism to find negatives. Therefore the eBay solution 
is far from perfect, it mitigates the problem of “cash and run” but leaves still the possibility 
of perpetrate it. Nevertheless, assuming truthful feedbacks, in which buyers provide 
negative feedback if and only if the actual quality is sufficiently less than the reported 
quality, Miller demonstrated that binary reputation mechanisms like the eBay ones can be 
well-functioning and provide incentives for sellers to resist the temptations of 
"misrepresentation and sloth" (35, Miller et Al., 2002). Even more, Dellarocas (33) has considered 
the role of the type of information that is disseminated by reputation systems based on 
feedback information, and demonstrated that it is sufficient to provide eBay-style 
aggregate information instead of a full feedback history. 
The limit of the works of Dellarocas and Miller are the assumptions they are based on, in 
fact the model they assume imply cooperation by buyers in providing truthful and complete 
feedback, which in practice excludes most part of the the Games Theory findings 
(especially doesnʼt consider the existence of any Nash Equilibrium). 
Why then does eBay survive? What happens in practice is that eBay still works decently 
because a few of vocally unhappy customers mean that a vendor's reputation is 
completely ruined (2, Resnick et Al., 2000).
 
4.5.4. Problem 4: Verifying and Validating Assertions
So if just a few unhappy buyers can ruin a sellerʼs reputation it is clear that yet another 
thing that is affecting the eBay system is that ratings are sometimes biased and not 
verifiable. eBay customers donʼt have the clear perception of this because of the unequal 
Balance of Powers discussed in the previous chapter.
Fig.4.1 - eBay tracking mechanism for past transactions
65
How than to solve the problem of verifying assertions? For instance being able to prove 
the existence of transactions makes it more difficult to forge a large numbers of entities or 
transactions. EBay users currently are able to directly “purchase” a high reputation by 
giving eBay a cut of a dozen false transactions which they claim to have performed with 
their friends. With transaction verification, they would be required to go through the extra 
step of actually shipping goods back and forth (2, Resnick et Al., 2000).
Validation means also making sure that the statements about some transactions were 
actually made by the person to whom it is attributed. 
One fundamental limitation of reputation systems in online settings is the difficulty of 
ensuring that each entity only presents a single identity to the system.
Individuals may expose some pseudonym identifier to the system, to which sets of 
attributes or credentials are bound. So given a set of statements not linked directly to real 
people, how can we believe them? Of course, one obvious solution to this problem is the 
introduction of centralized, trusted authorities to authenticate individuals when they register 
a pseudonym with the system.
Cryptographic techniques known as blinding may be used to prevent the authority from 
linking entities to pseudonyms while still ensuring that an entity can only present one 
pseudonym to some system environment at any given time. Unfortunately such security 
often raises an individual's barrier to entry, therefore in practice in normal online contexts 
are just used classic authentication techniques that only considers whether a presented 
identity corresponds to the expected entity, but not whether the authenticated identities are 
distinct from one another. The consequence is that in a virtual setting it may happen that a 
single person create and control multiple distinct online identities. Thus a dishonest person 
may establish multiple, seemingly distinct, pseudonyms that all secretly collaborate with 
each other to attack the system (see “shilling”, next chapter).
One technique in a distributed setting to bound the number of pseudonyms that an 
adversary controls involves requiring "proofs of work" for participating. 
To make reputation attestations, users must perform time-consuming operations (2, Resnick et 
Al., 2000). For example, reviews at online communities (which go toward the reputation of 
products or services) generally take the form of written descriptions of users' experiences, 
as opposed to merely assigning some numeric score. 
Making oneʼs reputation should also cost something, at least in time, in order to reduce the 
willingness of switching pseudonym easily after having dedicated to it lots of effort. An 
example of this type of mental mechanism comes from computers hackers. Computer 
hackers must protect their personal identities with pseudonyms. If hackers use the same 
nicknames repeatedly, this can help  the authorities to trace them. Nevertheless, hackers 
are reluctant to change their pseudonyms regularly because the status associated with a 
particular nickname would be lost (30, Kollock, 1998).
Other online systems may attempt to establish that users are actually humans rather than 
automated scripts, such as the graphical "reverse Turing tests" employed by Yahoo Mail, 
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where the user must read a distorted word from the screen, or describe what word 
characterizes a given picture (see www.captcha.net).
Usually web  portals requires also users to login -- i.e., a centralized storage and 
authentication facility -- in this contexts posted statements are implicitly valid and bound to 
pseudonyms. When centralized, trusted storage or aggregation entities are assured, users 
posting statements under their respective pseudonyms know that their rating will be 
included in their target's report or aggregated totals. For example, eBay ensures that they 
expose all the feedback on a given user. Furthermore, they can limit feedback to those 
identities performing a transaction, i.e., the winner of an auction, to limit shilling attacks.
However, while these approaches may bind the number of pseudonyms or attestations, 
they certainly cannot ensure the one-to-one correspondence. 
Friedman (34) considered the social cost of cheap  pseudonyms, and noted that participants 
that can effortlessly adopt a new pseudonym should rationally do so whenever their 
reputation falls below that of a newcomer to a system. As one solution, Friedman proposes 
that participants can choose to adopt {once-in-a-lifetime} (1L) pseudonyms for particular 
arenas, such as product classes on eBay or discussion threads on Slashdot. These 1L 
pseudonyms allow a participant to commit to maintaining a single identity and can be 
implemented with a trusted intermediary and the standard encryption technique of blind 
signatures.
The inability to easily bind pseudonyms to single identities, and therefore being in the 
situation in which it is easy to forge many pseudo identities leads to severe security 
problems that in literature are addressed as shilling.
4.5.5. Problem 5: Shilling  
Among the simpler attacks that a reputation system can suffer the simplest yet most highly 
spread and dangerous, is called shilling. This term is often used to refer to submitting fake 
bids in an auction, but it can be considered in a broader context of submitting fake or 
misleading ratings, often exploiting identity forgery like it has been discussed in the 
previous chapter.
In particular, a person might submit positive ratings for one of her friends (positive shilling) 
or negative ratings for her competition (negative shilling).
Either of these ideas introduces more subtle attacks, such as negatively rating a friend or 
positively rating a competitor to try to trick others into believing that competitors are trying 
to cheat.
Shilling is a very banal attack, but today many systems still remain vulnerable to it. A very 
notable example is the AOL Instant Messenger system where one can click to claim that a 
given user is abusing the system (2, Resnick et Al., 2000). Since there is no support for detecting 
multiple comments from the same person, a series of repeated negative votes will exceed 
the threshold required to kick the user off the system for bad behavior, effectively denying 
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him service. Even in a more sophisticated system that detects multiple comments by the 
same person, an attacker could mount the same attack by assuming many different 
identities. So the solutions for shilling attacks are the same that apply to the problem of 
verifying and validating users assertions (Chapter 4.5.4).
Other typical problem with rating-based reputation systems is that sometimes it is very 
difficult to collect enough information to provide an associated reputation for every entity. 
The simplest imaginable reason is a very low volume of transactions or activity by the 
users. 
4.5.6. Problem 6: Bootstrapping the System 
Reputation-based trust must have some method to bootstrap the system (2, Resnick et Al., 2000). 
After a system starts but before sufficient ratings have been collected, how is it possible to 
make decisions? Sometimes, like in noncommercial domains, it may be fine to list some 
entities and declare no knowledge or preference. In others, it may be more reasonable to 
list only entities for which a sufficiently certain score is known. Initial ratings could be 
collected by user surveys or polls relating only to known out-of-band information, such as if 
the entity exists in some alternate real-world domain. As the user continues to participate, 
the system can collect more feedback based on transactions, interactions, etc... .
The process of building a profile for new users is an ongoing process throughout the entire 
lifetime of the system.
To efficiently bootstrap  a reputation system it is vital to leverage on the reasons that make 
people willing to use the application in which the reputation system is placed. 
A certain amount of studies on the reasons of online participation have been undergone in 
last few years. 
Most online communities grow slowly at first, due in part to the fact that the strength of 
motivation for contributing is usually proportional to the size of the community. As the size 
of the potential audience increases, so does the attraction of writing and contributing, 
creating a virtuous cycle.
Community adoption can be forecast with the Bass Diffusion Model ("Diffusion of new 
products: Empirical generalizations and managerial uses", 1995), originally conceived to 
describe the process by which new products get adopted as an interaction between early 
adopters and those who follow them. The key for a successful online community is to 
motivate participants.
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4.5.7. Problem 7: The REAL Reasons of Participations (And 
Not Participation)
Several motivations lead people to contribute to virtual communities and several 
researchers have investigated the matter. 
Peter Kollock (30) researched motivations for contributing to online communities in his book 
“Communities in Cyberspace”. In the chapter entitled "The Economies of Online 
Cooperation: Gifts and Public Goods in Cyberspace" he outlines three motivations that are 
interesting because do not rely on altruistic behavior of the contributor: anticipated 
reciprocity, increased recognition, and sense of efficacy.
Anticipated reciprocity. Active participants in online communities get more responses 
faster to questions than unknown participants. A person is motivated to contribute valuable 
information to the group in the expectation that one will receive useful help  and information 
in return.
Increased recognition. Recognition is important to online contributors such that, in 
general, it is a key ingredient for encouraging community participation and reputation 
development.
Sense of efficacy. Individuals may contribute because the act results in a sense of 
efficacy, that is, a sense that they have had some positive impact on the group and, 
sometimes, on their own self-image as an efficacious person. In this respect Wikipedia is a 
good example since the changes that ones can make on any article are immediate, 
obvious, and available to the world.
Another motivation, implicit in the above is Sense of community.  People, in general, are 
fairly social beings and it is motivating to many people to receive direct responses to 
whether one's contribution was helpful or not. 
In contrast to participants many people who join virtual community spaces remain lurkers 
and do not post.
There are several reasons why people choose not to participate online: having 
nothing to say/share, getting what they needed without having to participate actively, 
thinking that they were being helpful by not posting, wanting to learn more about the 
community before diving in, not being able to use the software because of poor usability 
and not liking the dynamics that they observed within the group (30, Kollock, 1998).
The work of Kollock, in one sense is very exhaustive and on the other hand has the 
limitation of being mostly based on peoplesʼ opinions and studies based on surveys. 
Unfortunately often people donʼt say all the truth.
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A more recent work, among others, which nicely explore the matter from a more practical 
point of view is “Six degrees of reputation: The use and abuse of online review and 
recommendation systems” by David Shay and Trevor John Pinch, 2006.
In this work Shay and Pinch, use as an example the famous e-marketplace Amazon.com 
to demonstrate concretely that reasons of online participations are mostly bound to 
economical factors rather than peoplesʼ good will. Shay and Pinch choose Amazon since 
they sell predominantly books that are a particular kind of goods for which reviews are 
particularly powerful because they help  establish the meaning of the artifacts in question. 
Moreover, at Amazon reviewers are invoked as a legitimate authority even thought the only 
thing required in order to be be a reviewer is participation.
Shay and Pinch found out that Amazon reviewer participate:
A. To share their opinion with the community,
B. To build an identity as a reviewer,
C. To get a job as a professional book reviewer,
D. Empowerment of seeing their name and review on a Web site and take pride in 
their ability to ‘publish’,
E. To legitimately (or not) promote a certain item,
F. Slur the competition attack others via posting negative reviews,
G. Self Promotion: “Reviews” from friends, paid professionals, author,
H. Review plagiarism (to promote or support the sales of a specific item, agenda, or 
opinion.),
I. To increase credibility and to build their identity,
J. Socket Puppets: Posting the same review multiple times for the same item, under 
different reviewer names,
K. Used simply for free advertisements or spamming,
L. Promotion of political agendas.
So in many cases people contribute in the perspective of getting a direct or an indirect 
economical advantage. This does not always turn out to be a security or a resource-
reliability problem, but often it does. Similarly famous, is the case of Microsoft found guilty 
for paying for reviews on wikipedia to promote their products (31, Richard Chapo, 2007). 
The conclusion is that economical factors are predominant in reputation based systems, 
and solving the problem of providing incentives for reputation systems to effectively elicit 
the right amount of feedback, at the right time and with the right level of detail, can be 
turned to the problem of leveraging on the “economy of reputation”  (2, Resnick et Al., 2000), which 
also implies leverage on economical factors or constraints to push security and reliability.
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4.5.8. Problem 8: Finding Economical Means to Incentive 
Participation and Leverage on Them to Protect or 
Improve Security and Reliability
We now have all the elements to conclude that the best type of incentives for community 
participation are the economical ones. The problem of finding nice means for providing 
such incentives can be reduced to a problem in the standard framework of social-choice 
theory, that seeks to implement good system-wide outcomes in systems with self-
interested participants.
Recent years have seen some interesting theoretical analysis that addresses different 
methods to tackle each of these challenges, although the analysis is often performed for 
quite stylized models, e.g. with simplified assumptions, and they are mostly not completely 
usable in practice, we can still draw some useful conclusions.
As an example in “Market  of Evaluators” (39, Avery et Al., 1999) they consider the problem of 
eliciting the right amount of feedback about a product of a fixed quality, such as a new 
restaurant or a new Broadway show. Noting that the value of information in early feedback 
is higher than in late feedback because it can improve the decisions of more individuals, 
payment schemes are proposed to provide incentives for a socially-optimal quantity and 
sequencing of evaluations. Early evaluators are paid to provide information and later 
evaluators pay to balance the budget, to mitigate the tendency for an under-provision of 
evaluations and internalize the system-wide value-of-information provided by early 
feedback.  But in practice the proposed model is unrealistic because it assumes full 
and honest evaluations.
Miller et al. (35) suggests the use of proper scoring rules to elicit honest and truthful 
feedback from participants in a reputation system. The basic idea is to make payments 
based on how well feedback predicts the feedback from later participants. Thus, in addition 
to collecting, aggregating, and distributing information, the reputation system also 
provides rewards and imposes penalties based on the feedback provided by 
participants. In the setting of an electronic market, feedback information provided about a 
particular seller by a buyer is used by the intermediary to infer posterior distributional 
information about the future feedback on that seller. 
The buyer then receives a payment that is computed, according to a proper scoring rule, 
so that the expected payment is maximized when the buyer provides truthful feedback and 
maximizes the predictive accuracy of the posterior distribution and honest reporting is a 
Nash equilibrium. 
The only problem that remains is that there are many  Nash equilibrium of the 
proposed payment scheme, so the proposed methodology  is in practice too risky to 
be applicable in a real context.
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Nash Equilibrium (source: wikipedia)
In game theory Nash equilibrium (36, John Nash, 1950) is a solution concept of a 
game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the 
equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by 
changing only his or her own strategy unilaterally. If each player has chosen a strategy 
and no player can benefit by changing his or her strategy while the other players keep 
theirs unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices and the corresponding 
payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium.
Stated simply, A and B are in Nash equilibrium if A is making the best decision he can, 
taking into account B's decision, and B is making the best decision he can, taking into 
account A's decision. Likewise, a group of players is in Nash equilibrium if each one is 
making the best decision that he or she can, taking into account the decisions of the 
others. However, Nash equilibrium does not necessarily mean the best cumulative 
payoff for all the players involved; in many cases all the players might improve their 
payoffs if they could somehow agree on strategies different from the Nash equilibrium 
(e.g. competing businesses forming a cartel in order to increase their profits).
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4.6.Conclusions
Despite the many theoretical and practical problems with online reputation systems it is 
possible to improve the current situation in many ways, exploiting the latest findings in 
research (even though they are based on simplified models) and the experience gained 
from a variety of real systems, like eBay or Amazon. 
Itʼs been also demonstrated that since reputation is worth money any online system that is 
equipped with reputation systems can benefit from a raise of in its value. Nonetheless, 
currently website like eBay do not push to apply more advanced solutions, due to the fact 
that they have more  convenience in being less safe but appearing to be more trustworthy. 
At the same time, it must be recognized that a more sophisticated reputation systems 
could discourage users participation, as a matter of fact maintaining a reputation for high 
quality costs at least in time and effort. Therefore a good reputation needs to be rewarded 
by, at least, the cost of building one. How to provide such rewards for keeping the system 
robust is still a not sufficiently defined task.
What appears to be clear, instead, is that social and economic incentives influence 
reputation systems design criteria in ways that a purely  technological discussion 
don't consider, and while the field of reputation system research is still quite young, it is 
evident that in a future in which reputation systems will play a more important role in any 
online identity management solution (2, Resnick et Al., 2000), this aspect will be crucial.
In conclusion, trying to summarize the characteristics of the (so far) state-of-the-art 
reputation system, it should take in count five aspects:
1. The type of feedback information that is collected in order to evaluate reputation 
(i.e. consider the right type of reputation system according to the problem to 
solve);
2. The form in which information feedbacks are distributed and represented (e.g. 
aggregated, complete history, time-windowed, etc.);
3. The interaction between psuedonymity and the economics of reputation (e.g. the 
relationship between reputation costs and reputation rewards);
4. The role of the reputation system in providing incentives for the provision of 
honest and accurate feedback information (e.g. introducing payment schemes);
5. Finally what algorithms can (or better theoretically could) guarantee the 
robustness of such a system (i.e. eliciting the right amount of feedback at the right 
time, eliciting truthful feedback and preventing strategic manipulation by 
participants).
Next chapter is about Reputation Community  Evaluation (RCE), which is a way of 
merging together a unique solution with the characteristics of the state-of-the-art reputation 
system above mentioned, tailoring them for the specific needs of digital communities which 
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rely on User Generated Contents (e.g. some WEB2.0 and Enterprise2.0 communities) with 
the purpose of ensuring standards of quality and fostering communities growth.
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5. Reputation Community Evaluation 
(RCE) 
Fig.5.0 - RCE = Bridging User Generated Content Evaluation 
with Community Members Evaluation.
75
5.1. Introduction
In Chapter 4 the focus was on reputation, reputation systems, online reputation systems 
issues and solutions. In this chapter the focus is on Reputation Community  Evaluation 
(RCE), a new type of reputation metric or reputation evaluation model tailored for the 
needs of digital communities which rely on User Generated Contents (UGC).
Currently the vast majority of digital communities are WEB-based, as the chapter opens 
with classifying them by three main factors: the presence of User Generated Contents, 
the existence of a Rating System for evaluating the UGC and the use of an explicit 
Reputation System for ranking UGCsʼ producers. According to this classification the RCE 
meta-model and the associated algorithm will be derived and explained; detailing 
differences, possible scenarios of application and benefits over the existing solutions. 
5.1.1. How User Generated Contents, Rating Systems and 
Reputation Systems blend together into the Web
In chapter 4 it has been determined that picking the right type of reputation system 
consists in considering factors such as the goal we are pursuing, the type of resources 
involved and the kind of audience (community) it is aimed to. 
Web  applications that rely on any kind of reputation model are no exception, therefore we 
can try a classification considering the three main elements that are influenced by the 
aforementioned factors:
1. The presence of User Generated Contents; 
2. The presence of a Rating System;
3. The presence of a Reputation System. 
Following this criterion it is possible to associate to each kind of web  application that rely 
on one or more of the elements listed above, to a reputation model, see table 5.1 
(comments after the table).
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 UGC cooperatively created by many authors  - UGC created by a single author 
 Rating System  -    Reputation System - / Not present
Table 5.1
In table 5.1, the first row, it can be noticed that E-shops applications usually donʼt rely on 
UGC. They sometimes have some sort of rating system for the goods they sell, which can 
be extended with usersʼ  comments and reviews. No explicit reputation system is 
associated to the users (buyers, voters or commenters). This reputation model can be 
defined as Soft Ratings Driven, in the sense that the reputation affects the objects of the 
business (goods) but not the subjects (buyers, voters or commenters).
In the second row, Auction-Based e-shops and P2P networks use ratings as a means to 
derive a reputation for the entity/person that is sharing resources or selling goods. In this 
case the relationship  between the rating system and the reputation system is many-to-one, 
in the sense that to create a user reputation are required several ratings. The model of the 
reputation system is therefore ratings driven.
In the third row, wikis, such as wikipedia, rely on the cooperative work of their members to 
create UGC in the form of articles. Sometimes the reputation of the authors is evaluated 
according to the type and the amount of their contributions (see wikipedia Barnstar system, chapter 4). 
The relationship  between UGC and the reputation system is many-to-one, many UGCs 
contribute to create a user reputation. The model is therefore Contents-Driven. There is an 
extensive usage of this model also in web forums, which usually aggregate user 
reputations counting the number of posts of a single user. Users reputations are then used 
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to grant to the most active members moderation privileges. Of course, has explained in 
chapter 4, the system can suffer security issues. 
In the last row of table 5.1 is were the remaining web  applications that rely on UGCs and 
have an associated rating system, which is used as a means to  rank the contents. There 
are several  examples of this kind: You-Tube, some Blogs, etc... 
We can classify this Reputation Model as Soft Ratings-Driven because the reputation is 
derived through an explicit rating system that affects the objects of the business (UGCs) 
but not, or just indirectly, the subjects (contributors or voters).
There are also variations on this last reputation model. For instance some website 
generates an explicit reputation for their users aggregating the scores achieved through 
their contents. 
This variation on the Reputations Model is at the present not as common as the previous. 
It uses reputation mainly to rank user and sometimes to reward them with virtual 
achievements accordingly. Users can then sport these achievements in their personal 
profiles. Less frequently users in top-N ranking get also some small prize.
In this type of model usersʼ  reputation doesnʼt have any (or a loose) impact on the rating 
system. Also, the reputation usually doesnʼt affect all the users but only the ones that 
provide contents, excluding thus the raters. This way the mechanism opens the doors to 
more than one security problem, the most evident is the unbalanced power of peers (Chapter 
4). 
Because the model is flawed it canʼt take complete advantage of the potential that 
reputation has to offer. Nonetheless a model which comprises UGC, a Rating System and 
a Reputation System, if more robust, could be very valuable. The existence of this model 
is the assumption on which is based the topic of this thesis: the Reputation Community 
Evaluation model (RCE). 
RCE is meant to be a reputation model tailored for the needs of digital communities which 
rely on User Generated Contents (UGC). The goal of the model is to guarantee UGC 
standards of quality and a healthy growth of the community.
What follow is how to create such a model. The first step  is to define RCE basic building 
blocks.
5.2.Defining RCE Building Blocks
Obviously any RCE model must comprise of UGC, a Rating System and a Reputation 
System. To visually define the building blocks of an RCE model the same notation of table 
5.1 can be used, obtaining table 5.2.
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UGC created by a single author  - Rating System  -    Reputation System 
Table 5.2
The RCE model has similarities with both Content-Driven and Ratings-Driven reputation 
systems. As a matter of fact it shares some of the functional building blocks with both, but 
It cannot be defined as either Content-Driven or Ratings-Driven.
The arrows in the model of table 5.2 represent the way the building blocks are connected 
and interact. In the RCE model users share with the community UGC, that are evaluated 
by community members through a Global Rating System, which is used to infer users 
Reputations. 
What makes RCE model substantially different with respect to the formers (table 5.1) is the 
need of an EXPLICIT Social Network Infrastructure, capable of “glueing” all the building 
blocks. For this reason RCE should be defined a Community Driven reputation model.
The presence at once of all the building blocks of the previous models (UGC, Rating 
System and Reputation System) is not per-se a major difference. The real difference is in 
the way they are connected and interact with one another. In this respect the model of 
table 5.2 was on purpose left uncompleted, for instance, it still suffers from the unbalanced 
power of peers problem. In order to prevent this and other hazards we need to improve the 
model by introducing some refinements. 
Following subchapters aim to explain how to merge in a unique solution the characteristics 
of the state-of-the-art reputation systems discussed in chapter 4, with some innovative 
approaches to obtain a more robust RCE model, concluding that any RCE model, in order 
to be considered sufficiently secure, should: 
1. Operate by Approval Votes; 
2. Operate Accordingly to Voters Reputations and Commitment (over a fixed 
time period.);
3. Use Blind Ratings; 
4. Grant Voters Anonymity;
5. Exhibit a Bidirectional Behavior;
6. Consider Action and Resource Weights.
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Following the detailed explanation of the features of above.
5.2.1. Approval Votes
One of RCE goals is to guarantee UGC of a certain quality. Being RCE a Community-
Based reputation model, this translates in finding a way to remove those UGC that donʼt 
meet the community approval.
On the operative standpoint this means that every resource produced by the members of 
the community (blog articles, pictures, videos, documents, etc...) require it to be approved 
in order to remain in the system. 
Obviously this affects the rating system, which should apply some automatic mechanism in 
order to approve (or reject) resources. For example we could simply decide that on a scale 
from 1 to 10 only the resources with an average score higher than 5 are considered 
approved and can therefore remain in the system. 
Once the approval procedure ends resources canʼt be voted any further and they are 
either archived with a final score equal to the approval score or, upon rejection, removed 
from the system. 
From the visual standpoint the model changes as follows:
UGC created by a single author  - Rating System  -    Reputation System
Table 5.3
The relationship  between UGCs and reputation system remains many-to-one. As before 
many UGCs contribute to create a user reputation, nevertheless now the rating system 
has a retro-effect on the resources.  A low score implies the removal of the resource from 
the system. For this reason the relationship  between UGC and rating system is now 
bidirectional (red arrow).
The approval approach is opposite to the cumulative approach in which any given 
resource, is by default, considered approved and, unless reported inappropriate, remains 
archived in the system collecting votes cumulatively no matter the quality. In the Web there 
are various notable example of this kind (e.g. youTube.com).
Obviously the approval method, differentiates from cumulative ones, and must include 
ways to decide when a resource is mature to undergo the approval procedure. In this 
80
respect there are many possibilities; for instance we can decide that a resource is ready to 
be evaluated if has reached a certain amount of votes within a fixed time period. If the time 
period expires and the resource does not collect enough votes it is automatically discarded 
by the system. After-all if a resource does not get enough attention by the community it is 
clearly not valuable enough and therefore can be removed.
We can sophisticate this method by adding more constraints. For instance we can impose 
the sum of votersʼ  reputations to be above a certain value. This latter constraint can be 
especially useful in order to guarantee a good ratio between votesʼ quality and quantity 
and most importantly to help prevent security hazards like identity forgery [see Chapter 5.2.6]. 
Deciding the minimum amount of votes, the time limit or the cumulative reputation needed 
to start the approval process depends on single digital communities specific 
characteristics.
Factors like community size, user participation and resources life cycle can be very 
influent. For instance we cannot require too many votes to approve a resource if the 
community is too small or if its members are not very active. Similarly we canʼt afford to 
stretch too much the approval time period if the resources life cycle is very short. The risk 
is that by the time the resources are approved they are already too old (e.g. blog news). 
Approval Votes Example
As an example of the RCE Approval Votes principle letʼs consider a system in which 
every new resource posted, in order to undergo the approval procedure, needs a minimum 
amount of 3 votes within a maximum time window of 5 days. Resources that donʼt match 
the aforementioned constraints are considered expired and then automatically removed 
from the system. Also, to be considered approved and therefore to be kept inside the 
system a resource needs a minimum Final Average Score of 5 out of 10 points. See the 
pseudo-algorithm and the examples in the gray boxes that follows (Fig. 5.1, 5.2).
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Class Resource {
minVotes =3; //minimum number of votes for undergo the approval
aT = 5; // 5 days= approval time limit
Votes [3] = nil; //array of votes 
TotalVotes=0; // number of votes collected so far
Method Is_Ready_For_Approval?( Resource_Age=this.Age, Total_Votes=TotalVotes)
! if ( ( Resource_Age < aT) && (Total_Votes = minVotes) )
! ! // Resource ready for the Approval Procedure
! ! return ʻYESʼ;
! elsif (Resource_Age >= aT)
! ! // Resource expired, automatically deleted from system
! ! Resource.Delete();





! final score= sum(Votes)/minVotes;
! if (final score) >=5
! ! return ʻAPPROVED: ʼ + Final score.to_string  ;
! else





! Votes [TotalVotes]= vote_value;
! TotalVotes ++;
!
! if (TotalVotes == minVotes)
! ! return this.Approved?;
! else
! ! return “Remaining votes: ” + (TotalVotes-MinVotes).to_string ;
! end
end
} // end Resource





Resource.Is_Ready_For_Approval? (1 day, 1vote)
=>ʼNOʼ
// Wait 2 more days or till the resource reach 3 votes
//Ex 2
Resource.Is_Ready_For_Approval?(8 days, 1 vote)
=> ʻEXPIRED!ʼ
// Automatically removes the resource from the system
//Ex 3
Resource.Is_Ready_For_Approval? (1 day, 3 votes) 
=> ʻYESʼ
// Than trigger the calculation of the Final score
//Cycle that check for expired resources
//For instance we can run this cycle every late night
Not_Approved_Resource[] = Find_All_Resources_Not_Approved();
For (i=0; i= size(Not_Approved_Resource);i++){
! Not_Approved_Resource[i].Is_Ready_For_Approval?;
}
// Automatically removes all the EXPIRED resources
//Ex 4 - our resource gets 3 votes [10,6,8]
Resource.NewVote(10)
=> “Remaining votes: 2”
Resource.NewVote(6)
=> “Remaining votes: 1”
Resource.NewVote(8)
=> ʻAPPROVED: 8ʼ
//Ex 4 - our resource gets 3 votes [3,3,3]
Resource.NewVote(10)
=> “Remaining votes: 2”
Resource.NewVote(6)
=> “Remaining votes: 1”
Resource.NewVote(8)
=> ʻREJECTED: 3ʼ
Fig.5.2 - Approval Votes Example 
(Class Resource pseudocode usage examples)
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5.2.2. Rating According to Users Reputation and 
Commitment
Normally in a community, whether digital or real, not all members are equal. There are 
users with a higher reputation and commitment than others. 
Denying this fact means flattering the relevance of the more proficient individual and 
inevitably leading to balance of power issues [see chapter 4]. To prevent this scenario any RCE 
model should grant to users with higher reputation a bigger influence than the others. This 
can be achieved simply by sophisticating the rating system balancing the votes with usersʼ 
reputation and commitment.
RCE assumes that reputation and commitment are two distinct values. Reputation refers 
to the average quality of the actions taken by the user (resources produced or votes 
given), whereas commitment is a quantitative measurement, compound considering only 
the amount of resources produced and approved.
Table 5.4 represents a quick example. It considers 5 users with different profiles, who have 
rated the same resource.
Users User 
Reputation 





(goes from 1 to 2)
Given Vote
(goes from 1 
to 10)
USER 1 9 2 10
USER 2 8 2 9
USER 3 6 1,7 9
USER 4 7 1 4
USER 5 9 1 4
Table 5.4
Considering usersʼ reputations and commitment, the final weighted score for the voted 
resource is:
(9*2*10) + (8*2*9) + (6*1.7*9) + (7*1*4) + (9*1*4)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- = 7.82
(2*10) + (2*9) + (1.7*9) + (1*4) + (1*4)
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Users 4 and 5, although have high Reputations (7 and 9 rep. points) have a low 
Commitment Factor, this makes them less influential than the other voters. As a matter of 
fact the resource manages to get a positive score (7.82) despite their low marks (4 and 
4). This is just a pretend example, a more complete one will be discussed in chapter 6.
Another consideration about reputation and commitment is that, in order to avoid the 
tyranny of the elders; that is the overpower of users that over time have collected an 
enormous amount of reputation and commitment points [see chapter 4], reputation and 
commitment must be evaluated considering a limited time period, in other words, only the 
actions performed in the recent past (last six months, last year, etc...) would be 
considered. 
This not only removes the tyranny problem, but at the same time forces the elders to keep 
productive over time in order to preserve their reputations.
Inside a community usersʼ  reputation history is very valuable information too. Computing 
usersʼ reputations only on the basis of the latest actions could lead to completely forgetting 
past actions, opening thus the doors to attacks similar to the eBay cash and run. As an 
example, if the system forgets usersʼ past bad actions after a certain period they can afford 
to put them in practice again.
To prevent this risk any RCE system must compute the reputation over the last N actions 
but at the same time should provide means for tracking usersʼ reputation history. In this 
respect, chapter 6 show a concrete example in which the system described provides 
charts to track and represent usersʼ reputation variation over time. To some extent the 
method resembles the tracking mechanism of eBay [Chapter 4.5.3], but it is more complete.
Another fundamental precaution is to forbid voting privileges to users with a too low 
reputation. It is harmful and useless to grant voting rights to users that have proven to be 
not up  to the task. At the same time the system must be tolerant, letting them the right to 
create new resources which, once approved, will improve their reputations, getting thus 
back their voting right.
One more precaution is to prevent the system in being too strict with beginners, blocking 
their right to vote before they have performed a minimum number of actions, which are 
necessary to create a reliable reputation.
5.2.3. Blind Ratings, Voters Anonymity and Bidirectionality
Yet another hazard that could harm the validity of our reputation system is cross ratings, 
which can be seen as a form of positive shilling [see chapter 4]. Positive shilling is a system of 
cross favors that works as follow: I give to your resource a good vote and you make the 
same with mine, so we both increase our reputation.
To discourage this behavior RCE imposes blind ratings, and anonymity of the voters. 
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Blind ratings means hiding to the voters the partial score of the resources during the 
approval phase, to reveal it just once the resource is declared approved or rejected. 
Blind ratings clearly prevent raters to be influenced by previous votes, but per-se donʼt 
prevent cross ratings. To achieve this effect we need to force voters identity to be hidden 
too.
If voters identities are unknown and ratings are not visible to voters in the approval phase 
it is more complicated to organize a cross favor mechanism since the parts canʼt easily 
control each other. Nonetheless anonymity of the voters could open the doors to yet 
another hazard. Voters could use the voting mechanism at will to harm producers 
reputations without incurring in their (cross) revenge [Negative shilling, see chapter 4]. 
Now someone could think that this latter threat would be easily solved via ubiquitous 
anonymity, that is the anonymity of both parts, voters and producers. Nevertheless RCE 
methodology discourages the application of this solution because of potential security 
hazards [See chapters 4 and 5.5.1] and also because RCE considers producers identities as an 
important feature of the resources themselves, and shouldnʼt therefore be hidden.
RCE solves the problem in a different way, using a bidirectional voting mechanism.
By construction any RCE model evaluates community membersʼ  reputations by exploiting 
their resources ratings. A bidirectional bond links usersʼ reputations with their resourcesʼ 
ratings, since the latter must be used to evaluate the former and the former are used to 
weight the latter. In light of this consideration, the RCE model must be updated with a 
bidirectional arrow connecting the rating system with the reputation system (see table 5.5).
UGC created by a single author  - Rating System  -    Reputation System
Table 5.5
RCE ʻbidirectionalityʼ  is even more sophisticated than what can be appreciated at first 
glance from the model above. In RCE, a bidirectional rating system implies that a resource 
approval score impacts not only the reputation of the producer but also the reputations of 
all voters, too. This is obviously required to avoid balance of powers that privilege voters 
over resource producers.
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Deriving a reputation score for a producer usually consists in calculating an average of all 
its resource votes. Deriving a reputation score for voters is less obvious, but with RCE we 
can solve the problem exploiting its specific characteristics. 
Since RCE ratings are collected blindly  to the voters, weighted according to voters 
reputation & commitment, and the resources undergo an approval procedure, we can 
imagine for voters a rating method that works comparing their votes vs. the resource final 
score. 
A possible procedure is the following. 
Once a resource has obtained a definitive score we consider, for every voter, the distance 
between the given vote and the resource final score. 
If the distance is within a certain tolerance (excess or defect), the voter is rewarded with a 
positive vote, if the distance is outside the tolerance the voter gets a negative vote. Both, 
negative and positive votes must be balanced according to the accuracy shown by the 
voter (i.e. the closer is the voterʼs rating to the resource final score the better the voter 
should be rated). 
Choosing the right tolerance value is a design problem which depends on the 
characteristics of the community and on the nature of the resources evaluated.
Considering this last refinement the final reputation of the user is computed considering 
not only the average of the votes obtained posting resources, but also voting 
someone elseʼs resources. 
The benefit of a bidirectional rating system is obvious; voters behavior is forced to be more 
responsible and less random.
Bidirectionality though is prone to severe security hazards if not applied in concomitance 
with blind ratings and voters anonymity. As an example if during the approval phase users 
could see the partial votes they could adjust their ratings accordingly to maximize their 
reputation gain, rather than voting faithfully to their knowledge and opinions.
Yet another observation is that the method still favors voters over producers. Voting a 
resource needs less effort than producing one, users could than start trying to develop 
their reputations only by voting, causing thus a contraction in the growth of the community 
in terms of resources produced.
Another complaint is that in the real world not all the resources require the same effort to 
be created but, since in our model they are all valuable at the same level, it is likely that 
producers will stick just with the ones less ʻexpensiveʼ to produce.
For the reasons listed above the system need to be further sophisticated introducing 
Action and Resource Weights.
87
5.2.4. Action and Resource Weights
Action Weights consists in weighting the actions of voting and posting differently, that is, in 
terms of reputation, considering voting less remunerative than posting. 
As an example letʼs imagine an RCE system in which voting a resource has weight 1 and 
posting has weight 10. In this system a user has posted 2 resources getting respectively a 
score of 7 and 8. The user also votes someone elseʼs resource, gaining thus a personal 
score of 10 points.
According to the Action Weights rule the userʼs reputation is:
(7p * 10w + 8p * 10w + 10p * 1w) / (10w+10w+1w) = 7.6 points
Supposing that the resources in the system are not all equal in terms of effort needed to 
be produced, letʼs introduce a new variable: Resource Weights. 
Using the example of above we can now imagine that voting a resource has weight 1 and 
that a post can assume either weight 3 or 10, according to the type of resource posted. 
Letʼs now consider a user which has posted 2 resources, one with final score 7 and weight 
10, and the other one with final score 8 and weight 5. The user also votes someone elseʼs 
resource gaining a personal score of 10 points. Userʼs reputation computed applying 
Action and Resource Weights now becomes:
(7p * 10w + 8p * 3w + 10p * 1w) / (10w+3w+1w) = 7.4 points
Action and Resource Weights can be further refined, weʼll see how in chapter 5.2.6 
example. 
5.2.5. Complete RCE Model
Considering Resource Weights and the Commitment Factor discussed in chapter 5.2.2 
it is understood that in the RCE model usersʼ reputations are directly affected also by the 
amount of UGC created and their nature/value. So, since n UGC contribute to generate 1 
userʼs reputation, to visually complete the RCE model we need to connect UGC with the 
Reputation System with one way arrow (table 5.6). 
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 UGC created by a single author  - Rating System  -    Reputation System
Table 5.6
5.2.6. An Example to Recap
In this chapter weʼll use another pretend example in order to better clarify chapters  5.2 
main concepts.
Letʼs imagine a Reputation Community Evaluation system in which a resource, in order to 
be eligible for approval, requires:
1. A minimum of 10 votes, 
2. That must be obtained within a time limit of 1 day,
3. And with a sum of the reputations of all the voters above 50 points. 
In our play system, 10 is the maximum positive reputation for a user and -10 is the 
minimum. All beginner users have a starting reputation of 1 out of 10 (minimum positive 
reputation) and no commitment points. Users with negative reputation are forbidden to 
vote.
Now letʼs assume that an attacker posts a malicious resource inside the system and, in 
order to make it approved, forges 10 fake identities. These identities, as beginners, will be 
with a reputation 1 and no commitment points.
Using the forged identities the attacker gives 10 very high marks to the malicious resource 
he owns. Now the resource has 10 votes and becomes then theoretically eligible for 
approval. Nevertheless the sum of the voters reputations, considering that they are all 
beginners, is just 10 ( 1*10 = 10 reputations points), which is inferior to the required 50. 
The attackerʻs resource is therefore not suitable to undergo the approval procedure yet. 
The attacker then decides to forge 20 more identities.
Meanwhile some real users, with good reputations and some commitment points, start 
rating the malicious resource. They  canʼt  perceive that an attack is ongoing, the 
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approval procedure forces blind and anonymous votes. They arenʼt influenced by 
attackerʼs biased votes, therefore they give very low marks.
By the time the attacker is ready to submit more votes through other forged identities the 
resource has collected enough reputation points for the approval procedure thanks to real 
users votes.
The approval procedure evaluates the resource weighting the votes according to 
votersʼ reputations and commitment points, as a result the negative votes of the few 
real users have a higher impact than the many given by the forged ones. The malicious 
resource gets a low final score and is rejected.
The rating system works bidirectionally, so the rejection of the resource impacts on the 
reputation of the resource owner, which is decreased, and the reputations of the voters as 
well.
Forged users, which gave high marks, see their reputations decrease from 1 to negative. 
Honest users sees their reputation increase.
The attacker could now simply try the trick again, posting another malicious resource and 
reusing the forged identities he/she has previously created to vote it. Unfortunately, seeing 
that the reputations of the forged identities are very low, the system decides to forbid them 
to vote, and the attacker has now only two choices:
1. Forge more identities,
2. Try to increase blocked identities reputations posting in their name resources 
worth the approval.
The second option is more theoretical than practical, since it is obviously not worth the 
while. Forging new identities appears to be easier but, in concrete not even this option is 
that convenient, as creating several fake identities requires too much time and effort, 
especially if we bind them to unique identifiers, such as email accounts (like it usually 
happens in real web systems). Moreover, it must be mentioned that the problem in some 
cases doesnʼt really exists; for instance in Enterprise 2.0 communities accounts creation is 
exclusive competence of community managers.
There is yet another option for the attacker. He/she could simply use the complicity of 
other attackers. After-all it is convenient for a bunch of users to make an agreement to 
increase their reputations cross-rating their resources. 
The only risk is once again that some users outside the agreement could vote honestly 
causing loss of reputation for the attackers.
One easy counterattack to the cross-rating problem can be to increase the number of 
votes necessary to approve a resource. Unfortunately this solution canʼt be applied if the 
size of the community is small. 
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Yet another counterattack is to make reputation easier to lose than to acquire [See chapter 4]. 
In this respect RCE can operate simply by sophisticating the Action and Resource 
Weights mechanism seen in the previous chapter.
As an example letʼs assume that in our system voting a resource has weight 1 only if the 
performance of the voter is judged positively, and weight 3 in case of negative judgment. 
Letʼs imagine now that an attacker makes an agreement with some other people to cross-
rate their below-average resources. The attacker starts voting four resources unfairly, and 
thanks to the complicity of the others gains very good marks anyway: 8, 9, 8, 8. 
Now the average reputation of the voter is:
(8*1 + 9*1 + 8*1 + 8*1) / (1+1+1+1) = 8.25 reputation points
The attacker and his friends try to play the trick once more, but their attempt is this time 
blocked by other users, which were giving fair ratings and caused the attacker to get a 
negative mark: -3.
Now, according to the sophisticated Actions and Resources Weights mechanism, the 
new average reputation of the attacker becomes:
(8*1 + 9*1 + 8*1 + 8*1+ -3*3) / (1+1+1+1+3) = 3.4 reputation points
Without  any sophistication it would have been:
(8*1 + 9*1 + 8*1 + 8*1+ -3*1) / (1+1+1+1+1) = 6 reputation points
In conclusion with just a small tuning of the basic RCE behavior, it is possible to make 
reputation-loss easier than reputation-gain. Most importantly, the attackers losing 
reputation lose also influence in the system, making for them more complicated to iterate 
the cheat.
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5.2.7. Reputation Models Chart
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5.3.Security in Ratings-Driven Reputation Systems 
and RCE 
Another major aspect of reputation we must consider is that it can be subject to 
manipulation for various reasons. People use it to influence opinion to advance their own 
causes, to maliciously harm someone, or to curry favor by providing entertaining or 
seemingly confidential material. We need to understand what circumstances make 
reputation reliable.
Two main questions determine the security of a reputation system. First, what's the context 
for the reputation system? Second, who are the adversaries? (See chapter 4)
The capabilities of potential adversaries and the extent to which they can damage or 
influence the system dictate how much energy should be spent on security. In this respect 
we have discussed various examples of fraud like the following one from eBay.com in 
chapter 4:
“In mid-2000, a group of people engaged in eBay auctions and behaved well. As a result, 
their trust ratings went up. Once their trust ratings were sufficiently high to engage in high-
value deals, the group suddenly ʻturned evil and cashed out.ʼ That is, they used their 
reputations to start auctions for high-priced items, received payment for those items, and 
then disappeared, leaving dozens of eBay users holding the bag.” [LVII]
This type of attack can be expanded to entires companies:
 From Chapter 4:
“if a corporation, planning some millions transaction, would decide to base its decisions on 
websites that computes and publishes reputations for companies a dishonest vendor might 
want to forge or use bribes to create good feedback to raise his resulting reputation. “
The eBay example seems to be too different to be compared with any RCE system, where 
economical transactions are not present. Nonetheless, as will be explained in chapter 
5.4.4, RCE systems are encouraged to include rewarding systems based on reputation 
and therefore they may be affected by the same problem. 
Considering RCE systems founding blocks (Approval Score, Blind Ratings, Voters 
Anonymity, Bidirectionality, Actions and Resources Weights) and their community 
structure, which makes them capable to track usersʼ  reputations over time, we have many 
weapons to contrast the problem. 
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Even more, we will see that in RCE systems it is easy to put in place a rewarding 
mechanism that makes more convenient to develop  and preserve onesʼ reputation rather 
than “cash and run”. 
eBay tried to mitigate the “cash and run” problem with a soft tracking mechanism for past 
transactions [Chapter 4.5.3], but this solution is not perfect because it leaves still the possibility 
of “cash and run” and is very prone to bias. In this respect the RCE approach which relays 
on  Bidirectionality of votes appears to be more flexible.
Among the simpler attacks that can be performed against a reputation system we have 
seen shilling. This term is mainly used to refer to submitting fake bids in an auction, but it 
can be considered in a broader context of submitting fake or misleading ratings, similarly 
to what it has been discussed in chapter 5.2.6 about identity forgery. In particular we have 
seen that a person might submit positive ratings for one of her friends (positive shilling) or 
negative ratings for her competition (negative shilling).
Either of these ideas introduces more subtle attacks, such as negatively rating a friend or 
positively rating a competitor to try to trick others into believing that competitors are trying 
to cheat.
Shilling is a very banal attack, but today many systems still remain vulnerable to it. RCE 
responds to shilling attacks as described in chapter 5.2.6 combining, Approval Score, 
Users Reputation and Commitment Based Ratings, Blind Ratings, Voters Anonymity, 
Bidirectionality and Action and Resource Weights.
Other typical problems with rating-based reputation systems are that sometimes it is very 
difficult to collect enough information to provide for every entity an associated reputation. 
The simplest imaginable reason is a very low volume of transactions or activity by the user. 
In this respect RCE responds simply weighting user ratings not only according to their 
Reputations but also with their Commitment, implying thus that users with less activity 
have less influence than others.
5.4.RCE Some More Design Considerations
Yet another big point of reputation is the way it is represented inside the system [Chapter 4] 




3. Community Membership Life Cycle Wise;
4. Bond to a Rewarding System;
5. Translucent to the Users.
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5.4.1. About Transferability of Reputation
An important issue with reputation systems is reputation transferability.
In chapter 4.5.2 we made the following example: 
“If a vendor offered to discount past purchases, and if enough future customers buy the 
same product, it would be hard to get honest ratings for that vendor. All the buyers, in 
order to foster new selling and get the discount, would rate the vendor very high.“
To mitigate the problem we could apply complete ubiquitous anonymity  to the rating 
system. This would discourage alleys between buyer and sellers or, in the RCE case, 
between producers and voters. Unfortunately, there are no reputation systems that 
currently work completely anonymously and remain safe (1, Dingledine et al., 2003). 
Theoretically it might be possible to develop  such a reputation system, but we must 
consider then ways to address other type of attacks like the ones connected with spoofing 
or in this case pseudo-spoofing.
Since removing or completely hiding identities in reputation systems is a dangerous move, 
especially in Community Resources Driven Reputation systems, in tuning any RCE model 
complete ubiquitous anonymity is not an option [See also the blind ratings mechanism in chapter 5.2.3].
5.4.2. Reputation is Context–Specific
So far reputation has been treated as a single value attached to a single entity never 
considering that actually there can be several reputations per entity according to the 
context we are considering. Hassan Masum and Yi–Cheng Zhang, in the article “Manifesto 
for the Reputation Society” [LVIII] explains why reputations need to always be considered a 
context-specific value. Following an important passage from the article: 
"Reputation is context–specific. A Ph.D. degree, medical license, or award of merit is 
meant to certify particular abilities. When a credit agency evaluates your financial history 
and generates a reputation, the context is your ability to repay loans; this ability may be 
correlated with but is quite distinct from more general character traits. And reputation could 
refer to any of these more general traits, like oneʼs sense of humor or ability to work in a 
team.
Since there is no absolute objective reputation quantity stamped on peopleʼs foreheads, 
measurable proxies are necessary, such as book sales rankings, citations in academic 
papers, Web site visits, and readership of blogs. 
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...
Emerging information tools are making it possible for people to rate each other on a variety 
of traits, generating what is really a whole set of reputations for each person. (Information 
technology is also indirectly increasing the need for such reputations, as we have to sift 
through more and more possibilities.) You may mentally assign a friend a bad reputation 
for being on time or returning borrowed items promptly, while still thinking them reliable for 
helping out in case of real need. No person can be reduced to a single measure of 
ʻquality.ʼ
So people will have different reputations for different contexts. But even for the 
same context, people will often have different reputations as assessed by different 
judges. None of us is omniscient ...”
In the last analysis it is clear that representing peopleʼs reputations with just a single global 
value is a mistake. As will be shown with a concrete example in chapter 6, a possible 
solution consists in using a global reputation value which at will can be broken down 
according to single areas of activity or competence. Even more, for each area it will be 
possible to keep track of reputation variation over time.
5.4.3. Community Membership Life Cycle and RCE
“Given that individuals play different roles in social networks - they can serve variously as 
connectors, gatekeepers, truth-tellers and enforcers - reputations are tied to roles within 
social networks. “
(A Crowd of One: The Future of Individual Identity” 2007, by John H. Clippinger)
There are several possible membership  life cycles for online communities, among the 
most cited in literature is the one proposed by  Amy  Jo Kim (2000) in her book: 
ʻCommunity Building on the Webʼ. 
She states that members of virtual communities begin their life in a community as visitors, 
or lurkers [LIX]. After breaking through a barrier, people become novices and participate in 
community life. After contributing for a sustained period of time they become regulars. If 
they break through another barrier they become leaders, and once they have contributed 
to the community for some time they become elders. 
Other authors describe online communities membership  life-cycle according to  types of 
participation levels:
1. Peripheral (i.e. Lurker) – An outside, unstructured participation
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2. Inbound (i.e. Novice) – Newcomer is invested in the community and heading 
towards full participation
3. Insider (i.e. Regular) – Full committed community participant
4. Boundary (i.e. Leader) – A leader, sustains membership  participation and brokers 
interactions
5. Outbound (i.e. Elder) – Process of leaving the community due to new 
relationships, new positions, new outlooks
This five-step  life-cycle applies to many virtual communities like blogs, wiki-based 
communities, and RCE systems as well.
As it is evident membership life cycle is directly connected to users commitment over time, 
therefore, since in any RCE system commitment is a component of reputation, reputation 
itself must be structured accordingly. An example of application of this design principle is 
the way RCE addresses the tyranny of the elders problem, which has been discussed in 
chapter 5.2.2 .
5.4.4. Social Currencies and Business Models in Online 
RCE Systems and Enterprise RCE Systems
Most online communities grow slowly at first, due in part to the lack of motivation for 
contributing [Chapter 4.5.6]. The key for a successful online community is to motivate 
participants. In this respect we have concluded that economical factors (implicit or explicit) 
are predominant in reputation based systems. Solving the problem of providing incentives 
for reputation systems to effectively elicit the right amount of feedback, at the right time 
and with the right level of detail, is ultimately a problem of leveraging on the “economy of 
reputation”. To this aim Social Currencies can play an important role, driving a society from 
stagnation to innovation (Archelof, ʻmarkets of lemonsʼ). For this reason any 
implementation of the RCE model should use reputation as a social currency that is to 
bond usersʼ reputations to a rewarding mechanism.
This not only has the potential to propel Web  2.0 RCE communities growth but is basic to 
make any Enterprises 2.0 community efficient.
Enterprise is about business and business is about money. Enterprise 2.0 collaborative/
cooperative systems are wrongly thought to be, from the business-model point of view, 
web 2.0 systems and this usually causes problems. 
In a working environment having a knowledge that others do not have makes an individual 
very valuable. Therefore sharing onesʼ knowledge can be seen as counterproductive. 
Sharing also involves a significant amount of time from contributors, distracting them from 
regular working duties, usually without any additional monetary gain.
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Concretely Enterprise 2.0 systems can comport even losses for its contributors, 
legitimating thus reluctance for participation. A rewarding mechanism tied to usersʼ 
reputation is then a fair means to counterbalance their losses.
Counterbalancing loss is not enough. RCE systems can also empower employees by 
making more visible the ones with an higher reputation. This way the Enterprise 2.0 
System turns from an enemy to a valuable alley for effectively promoting oneself.
Also it can represent an invaluable data mining tool for executives in detecting the people 
with specific skills or with implicit leadership over the others.
Thanks to the RCE design characteristics there are many ways in which a rewarding 
mechanism can be implemented either in Web  2.0 or Enterprise 2.0 RCE systems. Of 
course there are differences from the approaches applicable to Web 2.0 RCEs and the 
ones suitable for Enterprise 2.0 RCEs. 
Letʼs make some examples.
Here are some further examples; In Enterprise 2.0 RCE systems contributorsʼ  reward 
could be measured using a meta-score computed on the basis of usersʼ performances in 
posting or rating resources. This meta-score should be converted in real money or perks 
according to a fixed exchange rate.
As an example letʼs imagine a toy Enterprise 2.0 RCE system in which the weight 
associated to posting resources is 10, and similarly the weight associated to voting 
resources is 1.
An imaginary contributor posts in the system 4 resources, two of them are accepted with 
approval score 8/10 and 7/10, one fails to meet the requirements for entering the approval 
procedure and is automatically discarded by the system and the last one is rejected with 
evaluation score for the producer -3.  
Our imaginary user also votes someone elseʼs resource, obtaining 6/10 as vote for this 
action [See bidirectionality, chapter 5.3.3].
Table 5.7 summarizes the events and the variables of the problem.
Userʼs Action Action / Resouce 
Weight 
Userʼs Performance 
(goes from -10 to 10)
Posting Resource 1 10 8
Posting Resource 2 10 7
Posting Resource 3 10 Automatically Rejected
Posting Resource 4 10 -3





The associated meta-score, considering all userʼs actions (posting and voting) could then 
be evaluated as the sum of all actions/resources weights balanced by the associated 
userʼs performances:
(8*10) + (7*10) +(-3*10) + (6*1) =   80 + 70 - 30 + 6 =   126
The exampleʼs user gets 126 meta-points. Imagine that 1 meta-point is worth 0,20€, and 
that meta-points can be cashed out at the end of the month by every employee as part of 
the regular wage. This way the user of our example would earn:
126 * 0,2€ =  25,20€
It is important to notice that every resource rejection or any action evaluated negatively 
causes a meta-score loss, which impacts on the users gain, limiting thus spamming 
problems and fostering quality of the resources.
Presently some online web  services which heavily relay on user generated contents, 
manages to be very successful even without any form of rewarding mechanism. This is 
mostly due to a very broad audience that makes them de-facto monopolies. An example is 
youTube.com. 
Although the web  is crowded with youTube clones, none of them manage to be nearly as 
popular as the original. The problem is that none of the competitors of youTube propose 
evident improvements over the original business model. The introduction of an innovation 
like a reputation based rewarding mechanism can represent the keystone to let new 
competitors to gain a broader market-share.
There are problems though. Collaborative websites, unlike Enterprise 2.0 RCE systems, 
can not afford to pay their users. The reason is simple, they can not rely on revenue from 
other activities to cover this cost. Nonetheless, different business models can apply.
In RCE systems the more a user reputation grows the more the user is thought to be 
reliable and the more it is likely that he/she becomes visible and its profile and resources 
generate page views. Exploiting this fact makes it possible to imagine an RCE system that 
gives its members the right to embed in their pages (e.g profile pages, blog pages, etc...) 
advertising in the form of Web  Ads (e.g. Google AdSense [LXIII]), granting them a revenue 
proportional to page views or impressions (ads clicks). Such a system would have a clear 
edge over non-RCE competitors, in quality of contents, thanks to the reputation 
mechanism and user commitment and to the rewarding system.
This advantage can be capitalized by the RCE platformsʼ owners advertising in common 
pages (e.g  the home page).
99
Advertises though might be not enough to make the community economically sustainable 
or profitable. One further step could be to integrate the RCE system with a digital store 
(digital music, digital books, videogames, movies etc...), in which the users could spend 
the money gained through the ads in the form of discounts on purchases.
We can imagine a healthy cycle in which people are attracted in the RCE system by the 
quality of contents, and they remain as producers in the perspective of rewards, granting 
thus a broad customer base for an associated digital store.
Even more, the RCE platform could be open and flexible, letting single users or groups 
create and customize their own RCE communities and try to attract audience and 
contributors. Without any constraint on topics, appearance, etc... similarly to what happens 
with blogging platforms.
In this case the RCE platform should provide the required social networking technology 
and a distributed cross-RCEʼs rating and rewarding mechanism, which could benefit the 
partnership with other external web  services and digital/web stores (e.g. Google ads, 
iTunes, Amazon, etc...).
In conclusion the possibilities in RCE systemsʼ  business models appear to be very broad 
and worth to be further investigated.
5.4.5. Social and Reputation Translucence
Social Translucence, definition (from Wikipedia):
“Social translucence is a term that was proposed by Thomas Erickson and Wendy A. 
Kellogg to refer to ʻdesign digital systems that support coherent behavior by making 
participants and their activities visible to one anotherʼ.
Social translucence represents a tool for transparency, which function is to
1. Stimulate online participation
2. Facilitate collaboration (via collaborative filtering but also by helping the 
construction of trust)
3. Facilitate navigation (social navigation)
Social translucence is in particular a core element in Online social networking such as 
FaceBook or LinkedIn, in which they intervene in the possibility for people to expose their 
online identity, but also in the creation of awareness of other people activities, that are for 
instance present in the activity feeds that these systems make available.”
Social translucence mechanisms are part of many web  2.0 systems such as: Online 
communities, Online social networking, Wikis and of course are parts of any RCE systems 
too.
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Besides Social Translucence, RCE systems require something more specific,  which 
could be defined as: Reputation Translucence. 
Reputation Translucence refers to design principles that support comprehension of the 
way reputation is represented and formed inside RCE systems. It is comprised of three 
main elements:
1. Ad-hoc Interfaces (and/or metaphors). 
2. Transparent Reputation Algorithms. Any security decision should not be taken 
on the fact that the reputation evaluation algorithm is unknown to the users. It is a 
security hazard rather than an efficient solution because once the algorithm is 
unveiled, the system whole is compromised. On the contrary it should not be too 
complicated to figure out, letting the users understand the rules of the ʻgameʼ. 
Security should be achieved only using the RCE defining characteristics [Chapter 5.2].
3. Reputation Development Mechanisms Interactive Learning. The system 
should not force the users to learn the way the reputation mechanism works, on 
the contrary it should be up to the system to drive ʻin-processʼ the user to 
understand the reputation mechanism behavior.
Reputation Translucence is paramount to the success of any RCE system, and must not 
be underestimated. 
In chapter 6 Reputation Translucence principles will be further clarified with a concrete 
implementation of an RCE system.
5.5.RCE Meta-Model and Algorithm
This chapter generalizes the RCE Model in a Meta-Model in order to define the RCE 
Algorithm, which represents the business logic that any RCE system must apply to score 
UGCs and to derive a reputation score for its users. 
Before starting we need some variables to describe the problem:
RCE Meta-Model Variables
Name Variable Range Description
Action A /
In a RCE model users can perform two type 
of actions: posting UGC or voting UGC.
Action weight Aw 1 .. infinity
Each action (posting or voting UGC) has a 
different weight [See chapter 5.2.4].
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RCE Meta-Model Variables
Name Variable Range Description
Reputation Time 
Spread
rT 1 .. M months 
Userʼs reputation must be computed 
considering just the actions taken within the 




1 .. D 
days/hours
Approval procedure must have a time limit 
expressed in D days or hours. After D days/
hours the UGCs that donʼt receive a 
minimum amount of minVotes are 
automatically removed from the system [See 
chapter 5.2.1].





The approval procedure requires UGCs to 
collect a minimum amount of n votes within 
aT in order to be eligible for undergo the 
approval procedure [See chapters 5.2.1].
UGC Weighted 
Final Vote
wV 0 .. 10
wV Represents the final vote achieved by a 
UGC after the approval procedure [See chapter 
5.2.1]. This vote is weighted by voters 
reputations and their commitment [See the 
definition of Pf below].
UGC Weighted 
Final Vote
AS 0 .. 10
Represents the minimum score that a UGC 
need to achieve to remain in the system.
 Userʼs Reputation Rep -10.. +10
Unlikely wV users reputation varies from 
-10 to +10.
Total Posts TotP 1.. infinity
Total number of UGCs published over time 




Proficiency Factor represents a quantitative 
value that should indicate userʼs 
commitment (e.g. amount of UGC posted 
and approved). It is used in combination of 




We need also a representation of the objects/subjects involved in our system, to this aim 
we use the following Class Objects representation (Fig.5.3 and tables from 5.10 to 5.13):
Fig.5.3 - RCE Meta-Model 
(Class Object representation)
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Each class is defined by some variables:
Class USERS
Column Name Description
user_id Unique user identifier
total_actions
Sum of the of the actions taken by a single user 
(voting or posting UGCs)
number_of_votes Sum of the voting actions taken by a single user
number_of_votes_within_rT
Sum of the voting actions taken by a single user 
within the time spread rT
number_of_UGC_created Sum of the UGCs created by a single user
number_of_UGC_created_ within_rT






user_id Unique user identifier
action_id Unique action identifier
action_type Vote or UGC creation
weighted_vote_received
Rating associated to the action of voting a UGC or 
posting a UGC
reputation_at_the_moment_of_action Userʼs reputation at the moment the action was taken
Aw Action weight
Pf





action_id Unique action identifier





action_id Unique action identifier
UGC_age aT
Content
Contents associated with the UGC (text, 
pictures, videos, etc...)
Table 5.13
Each user that belongs to the RCE system can perform two type of actions, that are either 
voting or creating UGCs. For each action there is an associated a value (Aw), a proficiency 
factor (Pf) and a userʼs reputation at the moment the action was performed. All of these 
values are used to evaluate  the weighted vote associated with the action, wich is the vote 
that the action scores at the end of the RCE Algorithm procedure. 
The RCE Algorithm is following described according to the definition of the RCE Meta-
Model.
5.5.1. RCE Algorithm
The RCE Meta-Model describes the way Users and UGCs are defined and correlated 
inside an RCE system. Relaying on the RCE Meta-Model, it is possible to define the RCE 
Algorithm, which aims at scoring the UGCs and deriving an associated reputation score for 
UGCs producers or voters.
The RCE Algorithm behavior can be schematized as follow:
Input: a UGC having the characteristics defined by the RCE Meta-Model is produced by a 
member of the community (UGC Producer).
RCE Elaboration: RCE proceed with the elaboration, which is logically divided five major 
steps.
Output: the UGC is scored while UGCʼs Producer and Voters increase/decrease their 
reputations.
Explanation
The RCE procedure starts when a UGC is produced and proceeds on in five steps that 
can be summarized as described in table 5.4:
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As a result of the RCE procedure the UGC is scored and UGCʼs Producer and Voters 
increase/decrease their reputations accordingly.
To better understand the procedure, following a more detailed description of steps from 0 
to 4.
Step0: after a UGC has been posted into the system it needs to collect a   certain 
amount of votes to be eligible for the approval procedure. We need of a way to detect 
when the UGC is either ready for the approval procedure or expired, because too much 
time has passed. 
One possible algorithmic solution is the following (Fig.5.5):
Step0: wait till the UGC reach enough votes to undergo the approval procedure. 
When the UGC is ready, proceed as follow:
• Step1: calculate the final score of the UGC weighting every UGCʼs vote with 
the associated voterʼs reputation and commitment.
• Step2: evaluate UGCʼs Owner assigning him some points according to the 
UGCʼs final score.
• Step3: evaluate each UGCʼs Voter assigning them some points according to 
the distance from the UGCʼs final score and the given vote.
• Step4: update Reputation of UGCʼs Owner and UGCʼs Voters considering 
the points achieved (or lost) at steps 2 and 3. 
Fig.5.4 - RCE Procedure
Class UGC{
Method Is_Ready_For_Approval?(Total_Votes, UGC_Age)
! if ( ( UGC_Age < aT) && (Total_Votes = minVotes) )
! ! // UGC ready for the Approval Procedure
! ! return ʻYESʼ;
! elsif (UGC_Age >= aT)
! ! // UGC expired




} // end UGC
Fig.5.5 - RCE Procedure pseudocode (STEP0)
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The algorithm above is similar to the procedure explained in chapter 5.2.1 . UGCs that 
reach minVotes votes within a time limit aT are ready for the approval procedure and can 
therefore pass to subsequent steps, the others eventually expire.
Assuming that our UGC reaches the necessary amount of votes within aT, the approval 
procedure can carry on with step1.
STEP 1: step1 consists in calculating the final score of the UGC weighting every vote 
with the associated voterʼs reputation and commitment.
UGC final weighted score (wVi) is computed averaging all the votes V given by k voters 
(Vk). Each vote Vk is also balanced by the respective voterʼs reputation (Repk) and 
proficiency factor (Pfk), as follows: 
If wVi is > AS (acceptance score) the UGC is accepted, otherwise it is rejected and 
removed from the system.
Proficiency factor (Pfk) is a value introduced as a quantitative measurement of voters 
commitment [see chapter 5.2.2]. The way to compute Pf is domain dependent, see chapter 6 for 
a concrete example.
 
STEP 2: now we assign some reputation points to the UGCʼs Owner (UoP = UGC 
ownerʼs points) considering the UGC final score (wVi). Algorithm shown in the box below 
(Fig.5.7).
wVi = ∑0..k [ Vk * ( Repk * Pfk )]  /  ∑0.. k ( Repk * Pfk)
Fig.5.6 - UGC final weighted score calculation.
if ( wVi  <= AS) 
               UoP  =  negative reputation points;
else
               UoP  =  positive reputation points;
end
Fig.5.7 - RCE Procedure pseudocode (STEP2)
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If the post final vote wVi is <= AS the owner receives a negative amount of reputation 
points, computed according to a domain-dependent strategy. Otherwise the owner 
receives a positive amount of points.
STEP 3: at step3 we assign some reputation points to UGʼs Voters (UvP = UGC voterʼs 
points) according to the distance from the UGC final score (wVi) and single users voting 
accuracy. 
If the distance between V (given vote) and  wVi exceeds a certain fixed TOLERANCE 
voters lose some points (negative reputation points), otherwise they gain some points 
(positive reputation points). The amount of points gained or lost must be defined by a 
domain-dependent strategy.
Algorithm in the box below (Fig.5.8). 
STEP 4: the algorithm ends calculating the reputation of UGCʼs Owner and UGCʼs 
Voters considering the points achieved (or lost) at steps 2 and 3. At Step  2 the UGCʼs 
Owner gain or lose some points (UoP), the same happens for UGC Voters at step  3 (UvP), 
now we can call both UoP and UvP just Action Points (AP), and consider them like a 
certain amount of points gained or lost by the users as effect of posting or voting UGCs. 
For UGC Owner : AP = UoP
For UGC Voters : AP = UvP
K = number of voters ;
Vk = vote given by the kth  voter ;
PvPk = points gained by the kth  voter;
for (k voters){
!
! if (abs( Vk - wVi ) > Tolerance){  
! ! // If the distance exceeds the tolerance
! ! // give a negative amount of points to the voter
             return PvPk = negative reputation points   
! ! !
! else 
! ! // If the distance is inside the tolerance
! ! // give to the voter a positive amount of points
! ! return PvP k  = positive reputation points
! end
}
Fig.5.8 - RCE Procedure pseudocode (STEP3)
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Not every action is worth the same. There are different actions associated with different 
Action Weights (Aw). To compute the cumulative reputation a user gains or loses 
performing the nth+1 action (vote or post) we need to multiply the associated AP by the 
respective Aw  as follows:
Cumulative-Repn+1 = ( APn+1 *  Awn+1)
Similarly to compute the total cumulative reputation for a user we need to consider all the n 
actions performed before the action n+1 within the time spread rT :
Once computed the Cumulative-Rep (Fig. 5.9) we can calculate the updated usersʼ 
Reputation averaging the Cumulative-Rep by the sum of all Actions Weights of the 
actions taken within rT: 
Reputation, differently from Cumulative-Rep, is a value that by definition varies between 
-10 and +10 ; -10 being the minimum possible reputation and +10 the maximum. 
Reputation can be used in order to rank users and sorting their contents, but also to grant 
them specific rights. Cumulative-Rep is, instead, a progressive value that is meant to be 
used as a metric in defining a virtual currency to reward users [See chapter 6 for a practical example].
Cumulative-Rep = (∑1..n ( APn *  Awn) in rT ) + ( APn+1 *  Awn+1)
Fig.5.9 - Coumulative-Rep calculation.
Rep = Cumulative-Rep/( ∑1..n ( Awn) in rT) + ( Awn+1)
Fig.5.10 - Reputation calculation.
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Complete RCE Meta-Model Algorithm
Now it is possible to define the complete RCE Meta-Model Algorithm in a function as 
follow:
Compute_RCE (UGC Ugc){
! while ( Ugc.Is_Ready_For_Approval?.equals(ʻNOʼ) ){
! ! //Wait for Approval
! }
! if ( Ugc.Is_Ready_For_Approval?.equals(ʻExpiredʼ) ){
! ! //Discard UGC from the system
! ! Ugc.remove_from_system!
! }else{
! ! //UGC is ready for the approval procedure
! ! //Compute UGC Score (wVUgc)
! ! K = number of voters of Ugc;
! ! Vk = vote given by the kth voter of Ugc; 
! ! Repk = reputation of the kth voter of Ugc;
! ! Pfk = proficy factor of the kth voter of Ugc;
! ! wVUgc = ∑0..k [ Vk * ( Repk * Pfk )]  /  ∑0.. k ( Repk * Pfk);
! ! //Compute reputation points gained or lost by UGCʼ Producer
! ! if ( wVUgc  <= AS){
               ! ! ! ! ! ! PoP  =  negative reputation points assigned to the producer;
! ! ! ! ! !       }else{
               ! ! ! ! ! ! PoP  =  positive reputation points assigned to the producer;
! ! ! ! ! !       }
! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! APn+1 = PoP;
! ! ! ! ! ! ! Cumulative-Rep (Producer) = (∑1..n ( APn *  Awn) in rT ) + ( APn+1 *  Awn+1);
        Rep (Producer) = Cumulative-Rep/( ∑1..n ( Awn) in rT) + ( Awn+1);
! ! ! ! ! ! ! //Compute reputation points gained or lost by each UGCʼ voter
! ! ! ! ! ! ! K = number of voters of Ugc;
   ! ! ! Array PvP[k] = points gained by the kth  voter;
   ! ! ! for (k voters){
! ! ! ! Vk = vote given by the kth  voter to Ugc;
! ! ! ! if (abs( Vk - wVUgc ) > Tolerance){  
! ! ! ! // the distance exceeds the tolerance
         ! ! ! ! PvPk = negative reputation points assigned to the kth  voter;   
! ! ! ! }
! ! ! ! else{ 
! ! ! ! // the distance is inside the tolerance
! ! ! ! PvPk  = positive reputation points assigned to the kth  voter;  
! ! ! ! }
   ! ! ! APn+1 = PvP;
! ! ! ! ! ! ! Cumulative-Rep (Voter kth ) = (∑1..n ( APn *  Awn) in rT ) + ( APn+1 *  Awn+1);




6.weBBrainys.com: Putting Theory Into Practice
Fig.6.0 - weBBrainys.com logo.
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6.1. Introduction
Chapter 5 was about the RCE methodology and its collection of guidelines aimed to avoid 
known issues with current reputation systems, foster community growth and improve user 
generated contents quality.  Any good methodology needs to be proven applicable; for this 
reason a case-study RCE system named weBBrainys.com has been developed; which is 
the main topic of chapter 6.
The first part of the chapter is about weBBrainysʼ  design choices and the way they were 
crafted around the RCE principles described in chapter 5. The second part describes 
system features, technological aspects and development methodologies.
6.2.About weBBrainys: A Brief Introduction
WeBBrainys.com is a case-study RCE system which from a technical standpoint is a web 
application, available free of charge at the address: http://www.webbrainys.com:3000. 
As any RCE system weBBrainys respects the fundamental building blocks described in 
chapter 5, which imply the presence of a Community, User Generated Contents and a 
Rating System. It is composed of a Social Network Service Infrastructure, whose 
members aim to share with the community User Generated Contents in the form of blog 
articles, which are evaluated by community members through a Global Rating System, 
capable to infer community membersʼ reputations through their actions in the community, 
which consists in posting and voting blog articles.
Functionally it can be considered a crossover between a blogging platform and a social 
network service, in which participants and resources are evaluated with an RCE reputation 
mechanism.
The name weBBrainys derives from the voting system, which exploits brain cells as a 
metaphor to measure usersʼ reputation and commitment. Brain cells also represent the 
digital currency used for rewarding the most proficient users. The more brain cells users 
collect the more they are considered successful. 
6.3.weBBrainys Reputation Algorithm Explained
WeBBrainys represents only one of the many possible ways of realizing a system that 
respects the RCE  founding principles. 
This chapter describes in detail the algorithm that weBBrainys uses in order to evaluate 
usersʼ Reputations and assign them Brain-Cells, which represents the digital currency 
bond to the reputation evaluation mechanism. 
We need some variables to describe the problem, to this aim the RCE Meta-Model 
described in chapter 5.5 can be used as a template, making explicit the values that the 
Meta-Model assumes to be domain dependent, such as: rT, minVotes, aT, etc... . These 
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variables are highlighted in light blue in the table below (Table 7.1). There is also the need 
for a new variable to keep  count of the brain cells that represents the systemʼs virtual 
currency: Brain-Cells. WeBBrainysʼ Brain-Cells logically substitute the concept of 
Cumulative Reputation [Chapter 5.5.].
weBBrainys Meta-Model Variables
Name Variable Range Description
Action A /
WeBBrainys users can perform two types of 
actions: posting articles or voting articles.
Action weight Aw 1 .. infinity
Each action (posting or voting articles) has 
a different weight [See chapter 5.2.4].
Reputation Time 
Spread
rT 1 .. 12 months 
WeBBrainys evaluates usersʼ reputation 
considering just the actions taken within the 
last 12 months [see chapter 5.2.2].
Approval Time 
Spread
aT 1 .. 5 days
WeBBrainys approval procedure has a time 
limit of 5 days. After 5 days posts that donʼt 
receive a minimum amount of 3 votes are 
automatically removed from the system [See 
chapter 5.2.1].
Minimal Amount of 
Votes for approval
minVotes 3
WeBBrainys approval procedure requires 
posts to collect a minimum amount of 3 
votes within aT in order to be eligible for 
undergo the approval procedure [See chapters 
5.2.1].
Post Weighted Final 
Vote
wV 0 .. 10
Represents the final vote achieved by a 
post after the approval procedure [See chapters 
5.2.1]. This vote is weighted by voters 
reputations and their commitment [See the 
definition of Pf below].
Post Vote V 0 .. 10
Represents the single vote given by a voter 
to a post during the approval procedure.
 Userʼs Reputation Rep -10.. +10
Unlikely wV usersʼ reputation varies from 
-10 to +10. Beginner users have a default 
reputation of +6/10. Users with a reputation 
lower than 4 have restricted rights (e.g. they 
are forbidden to vote).
Total Posts TotP 1.. infinity
Total number of posts published over time 
rT by a single user.
Proficiency Factor Pf 1 .. 2
Proficiency Factor represents userʼs 
commitment. It is used in combination of 




Name Variable Range Description
Brain Cells Brain-Cells 1 .. infinity
Brains Cells represent the virtual currency 
of the system. They can be achieved 




In weBBrainys, users’ Reputations and Brain-Cells, are bind to specific users’ actions: 
posting articles and voting articles. 
According to the RCE Approval Votes principle every new article posted is listed in 
weBBrainysʼ  home page with status pending, waiting for the necessary number of votes to 
undergo the approval procedure. 
Posts that donʼt collect at least 3 votes within an approval time (aT) of 5 days are 




aT = 5 days;
Method Is_Ready_For_Approval?(Total_Votes, Post_Age)
! if ( ( Post_Age < aT) && (Total_Votes = minVotes) )
! ! // Posts ready for the Approval Procedure
! ! return ʻYESʼ;
! elsif (Post_Age >= aT)
! ! // Post expired




} // end Post
// Usage Examples
Post.Is_Ready_For_Approval? (3 votes, 1 day) 
=> ʻYESʼ
Post.Is_Ready_For_Approval? (1vote, 1 day)
=>ʼNOʼ
Post.Is_Ready_For_Approval?(1 vote, 8 days)
=> ʻEXPIRED!ʼ
Fig.6.1 - weBBrainys Approval Procedure pseudocode.
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Posts that reach 3 votes within a time limit of 5 days are ready for the approval procedure.
The approval procedure as described in chapter 5.5 consists of a 4 steps process.
Step1: calculate the final score of the post weighting every vote with the associated 
voterʼs reputation and commitment.
Step2: evaluate Post Owner assigning him some points according to the post final 
score.
Step3: evaluate each Post Voter assigning them some points according to the distance 
from the post final score and the given vote.
Step4: update Brain-Cells and Reputation of Post Owner and Post Voters 
considering the points achieved (or lost) at steps 2 and 3. 
STEP 1: calculate the final score of the post weighting every vote with the associated 
voterʼs reputation and commitment.
Posts final weighted score (wVi) is computed averaging all the votes V given by k voters 
(Vk). Each vote Vk is also balanced by the respective voterʼs reputation (Repk) and 
proficiency factor (Pfk), like follows: 
If wVi is > 4 the post is accepted, otherwise it is rejected and removed from the system.
Proficiency Factor (Pfk) is a domain dependent value introduced as a measurement of 
voters commitment [see chapter 5.3.2] . In weBBrainys it is  computed as follow (Fig. 6.3):
wVi = ∑0..k [ Vk * ( Repk * Pfk )]  /  ∑0.. k ( Repk * Pfk)
Fig.6.2 - Posts final weighted score calculation
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Note that in order to prevent the tyranny of the elders [See chapter 5.2.1], Pfk grows at most of 
1/50 per posts approved within a time spread of 12 months (definition of TotP in the 
variables of table 7.1). Moreover Pfk canʼt grow bigger than 2, granting thus to most 
proficient users at most a voting influence doubled than the others.
Note also that according to the definition of Rep (table7.1) voting rights are reserved only 
to voters with reputation > +4, this means that although Rep  can vary from -10 to +10 , in 
the postʼs final score formula it is always a positive value. 
STEP 2: assign some points to the Post Owner (PoP = postʼs owner points) 
considering the post final score (wVi). In this respect weBBrainys customizes the algorithm 
of chapter 5.5 as follow (Fig. 6.4):
          !
If the post final vote wVi is <= 4, the owner receives a negative amount of points, 
computed according to the negative distance from the post final vote (wVi) and the 
maximum score (10). Otherwise the owner receives a positive amount of points equal to 
the vote of his post (wVi) (Fig. 6.5).
if (TotPk < 50)  
! ! // If the total amount of posts approved within last 12
! ! //months is inferior of 50
             Pfk =1 + (TotPk / 50)
else
             Pfk = 2
end
Fig.6.3 - weBBrainys Proficiency Factor calculation.
if ( wVi  <= 4 ) 
               PoP  =  wVi - 10
else
               PoP  =  wVi 
end
Fig.6.4 - weBBrainys Postʼ Owner points calculation.
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STEP 3: assign some points to Post Voters (PvP = post voterʼs points) according to the 
distance from the post final score (wVi) and single users voting accuracy. If the distance 
between V (given vote) and wVi exceeds the fixed tolerance voters lose some points 
(negative points), otherwise they gain some points (positive points). Once again 
weBBrainys must adapt the RCE algorithm of chapter 5.5 according to its domain-specific 
needs. The solution that has been adopted is described by the algorithm that follows (Fig. 
6.6 and 6.7). 
Fig.6.5 - weBBrainys Postʼ Owner points calculation 
(visual explanation)
K = number of voters = 3;
Tolerance = 2;
Vk = vote given by the kth  voter ;
PvPk = points gained by the kth  voter;
for (k voters){
!
! if (abs( Vk - wVi ) > Tolerance){  
! ! // If the distance exceeds the tolerance
! ! // give a negative amount of points to the voter
! ! // equal to the distance from Vk to wVi
               PvPk  =  - abs( Vk - wVi )         
! ! !
! else 
! ! // If the distance is inside the tolerance
! ! // give to the voter a positive amount of points
! ! // equal to 3 times the inverse of the 
! ! // distance from Vk to wVi
! ! PvP k  =  10 - (abs( Vk - wVi ) * 3)
! end
}
Fig.6.6 - weBBrainys Postʼ Voter points calculation 
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STEP 4: update Brain-Cells and Reputation of Post Owner and Post Voters considering 
the points achieved (or lost) on steps 2 and 3.
In Step  2 Post Owner gains (or loses) some points (PoP), the same happens for Post 
Voters at step  3 (PvP), now we can call both PoP and PvP just Action Points (AP), and 
consider them like a certain amount of point gained or lost by the users as effect of posting 
or voting. 
For Post Owner : AP = PoP
For Post Voters : AP = PvP
Not every action is worth the same. Associated with different actions are different Action 
Weights (Aw). In weBBrainys posting original articles is worth 10 points, instead posting 
ʻexcerptedʼ articles is worth 6 points [See chapter 6.5.4], therefore for the Post Owner the 
associated Action Weight will be:
Aw = 10 or 6 (according to the type of post)
Voting articles has also a variable weight, also. Voting an article weights 2 points upon a 
positive judgment of the voter and 4 points upon negative judgment. Therefore for Post 
Voters the associated action weight will be:
Fig.6.7 - weBBrainys Postʼ Voter points calculation 
(visual explanation)
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Aw = 2 or 4 (according to the outcome of STEP 3)
Now, to compute the amount of Brain-Cells  that a user gains or loses performing the nth+1 
action (vote or post) we need to multiply the associated AP by the respective Aw.
Brain-Cellsn+1 = ( APn+1 *  Awn+1)
Similarly, to compute the total amount of Brain-Cells currently owned by a user, we need 
to consider all the n actions performed before the action n+1 within the time spread rT:
WeBBrainys, in respect of the principle that reputation should be time-sensitive [Chapter 5.5.3], 
evaluates usersʼ reputation considering just the actions taken within the last 12 months. 
This way it can happen that the n actions considered in computing the Brain-Cells are 
inferior of the total amount of actions performed by the users since the subscription.
Once the total amount of Brain-Cells is computed we can calculate the updated userʼs 
Reputation averaging the Total Brain-Cells by the sum of all Actions Weights of the 
actions taken within rT: 
Reputation is a value that varies between -10 and +10, -10 being the minimum possible 
reputation and +10 the maximum. 
WeBBrainys uses Reputation mainly for ranking users and sorting their contents, but also 
to grant them rights. In this respect it is a bit strict, in fact, all users with a reputation lower 
than +4 have restricted voting rights (e.g. they are forbidden voting).
Total Brain-Cells = (∑1..n ( APn *  Awn) in rT ) + ( APn+1 *  Awn+1)
Fig.6.8 - weBBrainys Total Brain-Cells calculation 
Rep = Total Brain-Cells/∑1..n ( Awn) + ( Awn+1)
Fig.6.9 - weBBrainys Reputation calculation 
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Brain-Cells, instead, are meant to be used as virtual currency in order to reward users, 
even though, as will be explained in the last chapter this part of the system does not 
implement a monetary reward yet.
Following subchapters will further clarify weBBrainysʼ  domain of application and 
technological solution, in order to help  the reader better understand functionalities and 
implementation of this first RCE system.
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6.4.weBBrainysʼ Development Tools and 
Methodologies
WeBBrainys was developed under budget and time restrictions (i.e. no budget, and a very 
short time). The technologies chosen reflect thus the imposed constraints. All the libraries 
and the development framework are open-source, freeware and easily integrable in an 
Agile Software Development cycle. In any case they represents examples of cutting-
edge technologies in their respective fields. WeBBrainys was built on a budget but not at 
the expense of quality and effectiveness.
As web development framework it has been used Ruby on Rails. All Javascripts are 
handled with three main libraries, Prototype, script.aculo.us and Yahoo User Interface. 
Chapter 6.4 aims to give a brief overview about the technologies involved in the 
development of weBBrainys.com, the most of the informations provided are a brief or are 
excerpts from producersʼ websites or wikipedia.org, the free encyclopedia.
6.4.1. Ruby On Rails Web Development Framework
Ruby on Rails  [LXIV], often shortened to Rails or RoR, is an open source web  application 
framework for the Ruby programming language. It is intended to be used with an Agile 
development methodology [see chapter 6.4.4] which is used by web  developers for rapid 
development.
Ruby on Rails was extracted by David Heinemeier Hansson [LXV] from his work on 
Basecamp  [LXVI], a project management tool by 37signals [LXVII] (now a web  application 
company).
Like many contemporary web  frameworks, Rails uses the Model-View-Controller (MVC) 
[LXVIII] architecture pattern to organize application programming.
Ruby on Rails features several tools intended to make commonplace development tasks 
easier "out of the box". Rails provides scaffolding which can automatically construct some 
of the models and views needed for a basic website. A simple ruby web server (WEBrick) 
[LXIX] and Rake [LXX] build system are also included. By including these common tools with 
the Rails framework, a basic development environment is, in effect, provided with all 
versions of the software.
Rails is also noteworthy for its extensive use of JavaScript libraries Prototype [chapter 6.4.2] 
and Script.aculo.us [chapter 6.4.2] for Ajax [XVI]. 
Ruby on Rails is intended to emphasize Convention over Configuration (CoC)[LXXI] , and 
the rapid development principle of Don't Repeat Yourself (DRY) [LXXII].
"Convention over Configuration" means that a developer only needs to specify 
unconventional aspects of the application. For example, if there is a class Sale in the 
model, the corresponding table in the database is called sales by default. It is only if one 
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deviates from this convention, such as calling the table "products sold", that the developer 
needs to write code regarding these names. Generally, this leads to less code and less 
repetition.
"Don't repeat yourself" means that information is located in a single, unambiguous place. 
For example, using the ActiveRecord [LXXIII] module of Rails, the developer does not need 
to specify database column names in class definitions. Instead, Ruby on Rails can retrieve 
this information from the database based on the class name.
RAILS is a concentrate of innovative software development design principles, and it was 
fundamental for the successful deliver of weBBrainys. No other frameworks could grant 
today, the same productive ratio. 
6.4.2. Prototype JavaScript Framework and script.aculo.us 
JavaScript Library
The Prototype JavaScript Framework [LXXIV] is a JavaScript framework which provides an 
Ajax [XVI] framework and other utilities, for developing JavaScript applications. The features 
range from programming shortcuts to major functions for dealing with XMLHttpRequest 
[LXXV].
Prototype also provides library functions to support classes and class-based objects, 
something that the JavaScript language does not have. It is distributed standalone, but 
also as part of larger projects, such as Ruby on Rails and Script.aculo.us.
Script.aculo.us [LXXVI] is a JavaScript library built on the Prototype JavaScript Framework, 
providing dynamic visual effects and user interface elements via the Document Object 
Model [LXXVII].
It is most notably included with and Ruby on Rails, but also provided separately to work 
with other web application frameworks and scripting languages.
Script.aculo.us was extracted by Thomas Fuchs from his work on fluxiom [LXXVIII], a web 
based digital asset management tool by the design company wollzelle [LXXIX]. It was first 
released to the public in June 2005.
6.4.3. Yahoo User Interface JavaScript Library
The Yahoo! User Interface Library  (YUI) [LXXX] is an open-source JavaScript library for 
building richly interactive web  applications using techniques such as Ajax[XVI], DHTML [LXXXI] 
and DOM [LXXXII] scripting. It is available under a BSD License [LXXXIII]. Development on YUI 
began in 2005 and Yahoo! properties such as My Yahoo! and the Yahoo! front page began 
using YUI in the summer of that year. In February 2006 YUI was released for public use 
under BSD and it is actively developed by a core team of Yahoo! engineers.
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The YUI Library project at Yahoo! was founded by Thomas Sha and sponsored internally 
by Yahoo! co-founder Jerry Yang. Its principal architects have been Sha, Adam Moore, and 
Matt Sweeney. The library's developers maintain the YUIBlog where the YUI community 
discusses the library and implementations in its community forum.
The YUI Library is fully documented on its website [LXXX] and detailed API documentation 
accompanies the library download. It has six types of components: YUI core, utilities, UI 
controls, CSS components, developer tools, and build tools.
6.4.4. Agile Software Development
Agile Software Development  refers to a group  of software development methodologies 
based on iterative development, where requirements and solutions evolve through 
collaboration between self-organizing cross-functional teams. The term was coined in the 
year 2001 when the Agile Manifesto was formulated.
Agile methods generally promote a disciplined project management process that 
encourages frequent inspection and adaptation, a leadership  philosophy that encourages 
teamwork, self-organization and accountability, a set of engineering best practices that 
allow for rapid delivery of high-quality software, and a business approach that aligns 
development with customer needs and company goals. 
In 2001, prominent figures in the field of agile development created the Agile Manifesto. 
The Agile Manifesto states:
“We are uncovering better ways of developing software by doing it and helping others do 
it. Through this work we have come to value:
1. Individuals and interactions over processes and tools
2. Working software over comprehensive documentation
3. Customer collaboration over contract negotiation
4. Responding to change over following a plan
That is, while there is value in the items on the right, we value the items on the left more.”
Some of the principles behind the Agile Manifesto are:
A. Customer satisfaction by rapid, continuous delivery of useful software
B. Working software is delivered frequently (weeks rather than months)
C. Working software is the principal measure of progress
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D. Even late changes in requirements are welcomed (this does not mean code & run. 
Instead removing an existing feature or moving a deadline forward to 
accommodate late/unplanned feature requests)
E. Close, daily cooperation between business people and developers
F. Face-to-face conversation is the best form of communication (Co-location)
G. Projects are built around motivated individuals, who should be trusted
H. Continuous attention to technical excellence and good design
I. Simplicity
J. Self-organizing teams
K. Regular adaptation to changing circumstances
The manifesto spawned a massive movement in the software industry to the extent that 
nowadays, Agile Software Development refers not only to a group of software 
development methodologies, but also to the group of software professionals who foster its 
adoption.
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6.5.About weBBrainys: Features and Design 
Choices
In the chapters that follow, weBBrainys will be broken down in its fundamental parts: the 
Home Page, Usersʼ Profiles, Usersʼ Blog, and Usersʼ Statistics.
6.5.1. Home Page and Registration Process
Users can access weBBrainys home page (Fig. 6.10) by browsing http://
www.webbrainys.com:3000.
From a visual standpoint the home page resembles a news website. 
In the top  part there is a carousel with the most popular blog posts [Bubble 1, fig. 6.10] and 
in the center part there are briefs of the latest posts [Bubble 2, fig. 6.10], which can be 
filtered by topics accessing the thematic channels on the right [Bubble 3, fig. 6.10].
On the left the most successful users are listed [Bubble 4, fig. 6.10], which in the slang of 
the system are addressed as ʻBig Brainysʼ. 
At the top  of the page, next to the weBBrainys logo, there is a keyword search system 
[Bubble 5, fig. 6.10] which allows the user to find weBBrainys articles using specific 
keywords.
Fig.6.10 - weBBrainys.com, Home Page
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On the top-right corner of the page [Bubble 6, fig. 6.10] there are two main links: ʻBrainys 
Searchʼ and  ʻMy Brainspaceʼ . 
ʻBrainys Searchʼ  leads to an advanced searching tool used for finding people in the 
community, while ʻMy Brainspaceʼ leads to usersʼ personal areas.
Usersʼ personal area access is restricted to registered users. 
To be an active member of the community registration is required. Registration  is free of 
charge and comprises access to all website areas (users profiles, users statistics, etc...), 
posts voting rights and facilities like, a personal profile area, friendship  management tool, 
personal blog, and personal statistics tool.
To register or to log-in click on ʻMy Brainspaceʼ link or on the Register or Log in link on the 
right-top corner of the home page and fill-in the requested data [Bubbles 7 & 8, fig. 6.11].
Upon a successful registration an activation email [Bubble 9, fig. 6.11] is sent to new users 
Clicking on the activation link inside the email allows users to authenticate their email 
addresses and activate their accounts.
Activation emails are a necessary precaution in order to discourage security hazards like 
identity forgery.
Fig.6.11 - weBBrainys.com, Registration Mechanism
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6.5.2. Personal Profiles and Friendship Management
Once a user is registered and has activated his account he can access his personal area 
by clicking on the ʻMy Brainspaceʻ  link [Bubble 6, fig. 6.10] in the home page. 
Usersʼ personal areas comprise of the userʼs profile page, a friendship  management tool, a 
personal blog and a statistics tracking tool.
Personal areas can be browsed from the tab menu at the top of personal pages [Bubble 
10, fig. 6.12].
The first of the personal pages is the userʼs profile page (Fig. 6.12).
In profile pages users can add basic informations about themselves [Bubble 11, fig. 6.12], 
and also import some other informations from external web-services that they may be 
already using, such as: LinkedIn, Twitter or GoogleMaps.
In RCE systems users identity is very valuable information. Therefore weBBrainys 
encourages its users to arrange their personal profiles through many facilities. Profile 
images can be managed with an advanced online cropping tool [Bubble 12, fig. 6.12], a 
custom appearance tool allows user to personalize colors of their pages [Bubble 13, fig. 
6.12] and freeform info boxes [Bubble 14, fig. 6.12] can be edited using an advanced 
editing tool [Bubble 15, fig. 6.13], which allows text, picture, movie and widgets 
embedding. 
Fig.6.12 - weBBrainys.com, User Profile Example
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Fig.6.13 - weBBrainys.com, info boxes editor.
To prevent embedding of malicious contents the editor is provided with 
technologies that allows HTML tags stripping and javascript sanitizing.
WeBBrainys as an RCE system is characterized by a social network infrastructure in which 
social bonds have a relevant role, for this reason, part of a userʼs profile is occupied by 
userʼs friends data [Bubble 16 & 17, fig. 6.12] . 
In order to bind new friendships, registered users can send friendship  requests to other 
registered users through their profile pages. 
Friendship  requests are notified via email [bubble 18, fig. 6.14]. Receivers can accept or 
decline the request directly from the links provided inside the email, or by using the 
friendship  management tool [Bubble 19, fig. 6.15], which is available from userʼs personal 
area. 
Fig.6.14 - weBBrainys.com, Friend Request Email
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6.5.3. Usersʼ Blog
WeBBrainys users arrange personal profiles, make new friends and as in any RCE 
systems, are required to produce for the sake of the community some kind of user 
generated content. In weBBrainys this goal is achieved via usersʼ blogs. 
Personal blogs (Fig. 6.16) are part of users personal pages, and are visible to all users 
whether they are registered or not.
Fig.6.15 - weBBrainys.com, friendship management tool.
Fig.6.16 - weBBrainys.com, userʼs blog.
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The blog page contains, in the center, a list of userʼs most recent posts [Bubble 20, fig. 
6.16], which can be sorted according to the thematic channel they belong to [Bubble 21, 
fig. 6.16] and also according to their status. Like in any RCE system weBBrainys 
resources needs to be approved in order to remain in the system. Therefore posts can be 
in different statuses: draft, pending, approved, or rejected [See chapters 6.3.4 and 6.4].
The blog is also provided with an embedded chatting tool [Bubble 22, fig. 6.16]. The tool is 
meant to connect users with an online assistant who can help  users in the procedure of 
publishing blog articles.
6.5.4. Making onesʼ Reputation Posting and Voting Blog 
Articles
Posting an article is an easy and quick procedure.
Clicking the big red button ʻAdd NewPostʼ [Bubble 23, fig. 6.16] in the blog page allows the 
user to be presented with an advanced tool for editing articles [Bubble 24, fig. 6.17], which 
allows text, picture and movie embedding. 
Every post requires a title [Bubble 25, fig. 6.17] and a category [Bubble 26, fig. 6.17], 
which corresponds to the thematic channel in which the post is meant to be filed. Users 
can choose among a wide span of categories. In lacking of a suitable area, the article can 
be categorized as ʻNot Categorizedʼ.
Fig.6.17 - weBBrainys.com, posts editor. 
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Users can submit posts in the form of original articles or as an excerpt of other web 
articles. in this case it is compulsory to provide the source [Bubble 27, fig. 6.17]. 
In respect of the RCE Resource Weights  principle [Chapter 5.3.4] the reputation algorithm 
will judge usersʼ reputations considering original articles as more relevant than the 
excerpted ones.
Once the article is ready it can be saved as a draft, and then published as a pending post 
[Bubble 28, fig. 6.18] on the home page to undergo the approval procedure. 
During the approval procedure in a time period of 5 days the article needs to achieve 3 
votes; otherwise it is automatically discarded by the system. In the image above, the article 
is expiring in two days and requires two more votes to be judged [Bubble 29, fig. 6.18]. 
Once published the post is also reported to the attention of usersʼ friends via email [Bubble 
30, fig. 6.19].
Fig.6.18 - weBBrainys.com, pending post (Home Page).
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Every post (Fig. 6.20) wether approved or pending, is provided with some details about the 
author [Bubble 31, fig. 6.20] which are positioned in the left-top corner of the page.
Authors identity and their statistics are considered a valuable part of the post.
According to the RCEsʼ Blind Ratings [Chapter 5.3.3] principle voters canʼt see the partial 
score of pending posts [Bubble 32, fig. 6.20]; they just see the number of votes remaining 
to score the article. Moreover the rating panel, unlike the vast majority of rating mechanism 
available on the internet, does not use the classical star metaphor, but rather relys on brain 
cells (Fig. 6.21).
Fig.6.19 - weBBrainys.com, pending post email notification.
Fig.6.20 - weBBrainys.com, post example.
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The use of a different metaphor meets two design choices. Firstly, since usersʼ 
Reputation and Commitment [Chapter 5.3.2] are evaluated in braincells, it is sensible to use 
them on the rating panel.
Secondly the braincells rating system is an implementation of the RCE principles, where 
rating is meant to work Bidirectionally[Chapter 5.3.3], therefore the use of a less common 
metaphor can help  users to remind themselves at first glance, that voting is going to 
influence their reputations.
Braincells rating panel also meets RCEsʼ Reputation Translucence[Chapter 5.7] 
requirements in the sense that the starʼs metaphor could be misleading whereas the 
braincellʼs  metaphor is self-explanatory.
When a post reaches three votes the final score is computed considering voters 
Reputation and a Proficiency  Factor, which is a value representing voters commitment. 
In respect to the RCE principles post owner and voters are then evaluated with a 
reputation score calculated on the basis of the post final score. [See the detailed algorithm at 
chapter 6.4] 
As a reward post owner and voters gain (or lose) some braincells. The amount of 
braincells gained or lost depends on the quality of the performance . [Chapter 6.4]
If the post has too low of a final score it is rejected and removed from the home page. In 
case of acceptance it is promoted in the group  of approved posts, and its final score, plus 
some other statistics, becomes visible to everyone [Bubble 33, fig. 6.22].
Fig.6.21 - weBBrainys.com, on the left a classical star-based rating panel, 
on the right weBBrainysʼ braincells rating panel.
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Other precaution that weBBrainys applies in order to improve Reputation Translucence 
are approval email reports. Upon the conclusion of the approval procedure post owner and 
voters receive in their inboxes, an email explaining to them the way their reputations have 
changed.
In fig. 6.23 an example of e-mail sent to a post owner [Bubble 34, fig. 6.23].
 
Fig.6.22 - weBBrainys.com, braincells rating panel 
after approval.
Fig.6.23 - weBBrainys.com, Post ownerʼs approval email report example.
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In the example the owner is informed that his post entitled, ʻIntervista A Tony Blair Al 
Meeting Di Riminiʼ, has been accepted and the final score, weighted according to Voters 
Reputation and Commitment is 7.1/10. The consequent effect is a gain of 42.36 brancells 
and a reputation of 6.84/10 in the channel ʻPolitics and Governmentʼ, which is the channel 
in which the post was filed [Bubble 35, fig. 6.23].
The email provides even more information for those that like to know details. In the first 
table [Bubble 36, fig. 6.23] the authors can check the data used to calculate its reputation 
and braincells. 
In this example, the post has received a final score of 7.06 (which was rounded to 7.1). 
Therefore he receives, as author, a positive reputation score of +7.06 points, that 
multiplied by 6, the weight associated to posting an article with source (i.e. extracted from 
another web  article) generates a gain of 42.36 braincells. The table [Bubble 36, fig. 6.23], 
comes with a legend at the bottom for a better understanding.
The author is also informed about votes details with a table [Bubble 37, fig. 6.23] reporting 
each given vote, single voters influence (a compound value that considers voters 
Reputation and Proficiency), their final performance in terms of voting accuracy (computed 
according to the distance from the given vote and the final score) and their consequent 
achievement in terms of braincells.
Note that voters identities are hidden, in respect of the RCE Voters Anonymity   principle. 
[Chapter 5.3.3]
For a better usersʼ comprehension the table [Bubble 37, fig. 6.23] is provided with a legend 
(not visible in the image).
At the end of the approval procedure, voters receive an email report similar to the post 
author one [Bubble 38, fig. 6.24].
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In the image above one of the voters is informed that the post he has voted has reached 
the final score of 7.1/10, and that his voting accuracy has been judged Approximative, 
causing him the loss of -11.76 braincells and a decrement of reputation in the channel 
ʻPolitics and Governmentʼ.
To understand why the user has been judged negatively we need to check the table 
named ʻVoters Scoring Detailsʼ [Bubble 40, fig. 6.24]. 
From the table we can see that the voter was giving to the post a score of 10/10 and that 
his voting influence was very low 0.5, on the contrary voters with a much higher influence 
were giving lower marks, causing thus the post to achieve a final score of only 7.1/10. 
Considering now the distance of almost three points from the post final score and the vote 
given by the user the system has judged his vote approximative.
From the table we can also see that the Action Weight associated with voters judged fair 
is 2 and that, on the contrary, the Action Weight associated to voters judged unfair is 4. 
Fig.6.24 - weBBrainys.com, Post votersʼ approval email report example.
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This happens in accordance to what was discussed in chapter 5.4.5 about making 
reputation easier to lose than to acquire. In fact, a voting accuracy of -2.94 points 
multiplied by an Action Weight  of 4 causes a loss of -11.75 braincells, rather than only 
-2.94*2 = -5.88 braincells. 
6.5.5. Keeping Track of Reputations and Braincells
Other basic requirement for any RCE system is the ability to keep  track over time of 
reputation variation (see chapter 5.5.3), and being able to break down usersʼ  reputation 
according to different context (see chapter 5.5.2). In this attempt weBBrainys provides for 
any registered user a statistical tool, accessible from the usersʼ personal area (Fig. 6.25).
Any user can browse different statistics [Bubble 43 & 44, fig. 6.26], like: posts approved by 
channel, votes given by channel, current reputation by channel, current braincells by 
channel and also reputation and braincells variation over time by different channels.
Users statistics are publicly accessible by every user, and represents a sort of usersʼ 
Reputation Identity Card [Bubble 44, fig. 6.26].
Fig.6.25 - weBBrainys.com, Userʼs statistics management tool.
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Fig.6.26 - weBBrainys.com, various usersʼ statistics example.
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If social and human factors are involved they prevail over any algorithm or design pattern, 
as long as the methodology is good. Obviously the RCE approach, being based on a 
social networking architecture, is affected too. For this reason it is compulsory to deepen 
RCE social aspects discussing the results achieved so far, during the first 4 months of 
weBBrainys experimentation.
WeBBrainys.com is a reality thanks to the courtesy of Simbologica s.r.l, an IT  consulting 
company based in Milan (Italy), which has provided some of the facilities necessary to put 
in practice the project.
The company was interested in carrying out a little experimentation regarding Web 2.0 
social networks and Enterprise 2.0 environments for the purpose of gaining a knowledge 
about the topic and evaluating a possible internal adoption of Enterprise 2.0 working 
methodologies.
Webbrainys is currently still in its testing phase. It has around 30 members which are 
mostly Simbologica s.r.l. employees. These IT professionals are divided into two groups; 
senior employees and junior employees, generally with little knowledge of Web  2.0 and 
Enterprise 2.0 social networking paradigms.
The application was created to be used as a general purpose Web-RCE platform and also 
as an Enterprise-RCE throughout dedicated channels of exclusive usage of Simbologica 
s.r.l. .
The testing phase was carried out in two steps. In the first step, weBBrainys was released 
without any reputation mechanism, letting the users post freely, but still forcing every post 
to be approved through a non reputation based rating system. 
In this phase, after a positive beginning, some users started being less accurate, posting 
not so valuable resources and voting without paying the due attention, causing thus a 
lowering in the general quality of the resources, with a consequent deterioration in the 
perception of the validity of weBBrainys as tool and a decreasing trend in participation.
In the second phase, the reputation evaluation mechanism was introduced, with two main 
effects. The trend in active participation didnʼt change much, but posts started showing a 
stable medium to high quality. Participants also clearly divided into three groups: the 
enthusiastic, the lurkers and the afraid. At the moment, interpreting these behaviors, is not 
banal. The system needs more time to be completely evaluated, after just a few months of 
testing it is too early to come to definitive conclusions. The amount of participants (30 
people) is still too small and at the moment no monetary gain is provided for the users. 
The only reward is in gaining the pride of collecting braincells and proving to be oneself a 
capable individual in the community.
Introducing a monetary rewarding is certainly one of the most important goals for the 
future, even though this may not happen soon mainly due to because lack of founding. 
Nevertheless, there are some good results that must be mentioned. The RCE 
methodology, although more complicated than normal rating-based mechanisms, was 
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surprisingly quite easily comprehended, and the average quality of contents has actually 
raised and stabilized. Active participants showed a more responsible behavior, with very 
positive feedback by younger employees.
Fig. 7.1 summarizes weBBrainys testing results.
weBBrainys Rresults
7.2.RCE Limitations of Applications
The RCE methodology has limitations of applications which are implicit in the RCE 
definition of chapter 5. 
A Community and Resources Driven reputation system, like any RCE system, is built upon 
a Social Network Service Infrastructure. Here members aim to share User Generated 
Contents with the community, in the form of digital resources (blog articles, pictures, 
videos, documents etc...), which are not collaboratively modifiable (e.g. wikis), but are 
evaluated by community members through a Global Rating System, capable to infer 
community members reputations exploiting their resourcesʼ ratings. Also, in order to be 
considered sufficiently secure the RCE reputation system must: 
1. Operate by Approval Votes; 
2. Operate Accordingly to Voters Reputations and Commitment;
3. Use Blind Ratings; 
4. Grant Voters Anonymity;
5. Exhibit a Bidirectional Behavior;
6. Consider Action and Resource Weights.
Fig.7.1 - weBBrainys testing results.
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7.3.Further Implications of Research
RCE has several implications of research, which can be expanded in six different areas 
(figure 7.2). 
Social Currencies and New Business Models
The first area that should be further expanded is about different ways of implementing 
reward mechanisms in RCE systems pursuing innovative business models.
Apply The RCE Model in New Fields
New RCE business models could be crafted around new fields of application. Besides the 
ones cited in this document, which are generic Web  2.0 and Enterprise 2.0 RCE systems, 
particularly promising fields could be Social Media Marketing, Open Source, Educational 
and Online Gaming Communities, such as Xbox Live; in order to boost community and 
platform adoption.
Adapt RCE to Cooperative Environment
One major limitation of the RCE methodology is the non applicability to web cooperative 
systems such as wikis. This limitation is implicit in the definition of Community and 
Resources Driven reputation system. Nevertheless it could be interesting to investigate 
Fig.7.2 - RCE implications of research.
143
means to merge the Content-Driven Reputation Mechanism (Chapter 5) with the RCE 
Community and Resources Driven mechanism.
Reputation Algorithm Improvements and/or Customizations
WeBBrainys has proven that the RCE methodology is applicable in a real world scenario. 
Nevertheless, its algorithmic adaptation represents just one of the many possible 
implementations. Since RCE is open to modifications and variations in order to match 
requirements of systems with different characteristics further researches could involve 
finding best adaptations to different contexts and/or communities.
Social Network Analysis Integration
Social Network Analysis has been discussed in chapter 3.5 and in chapter 5 we have seen 
how relevant is in any reputation system to keep track of users reputation variation over 
time and how RCE approach this task.
Now, merging RCE with techniques and tools belonging to Social Network Analysis (See 
chapter 3.7) becomes easy to indirectly collect personal opinions, balancing them with the 
community knowledge and avoiding thus the problem of biased behaviors and providing 
better means to investigate in Enterprise 2.0 communitiesʼ propagation of reputation 
through Social Network Analysis. The main goal is to understand the ways in which 
reputation is created and maintained inside the enterprise community in the attempt of 
defining its reputation structure, which may collide with the imposed hierarchical one, and 
in case apply changes in order to make the community more efficient and ultimately more 
valuable.
Reputation-Based Search Engines and Bookmarks
The RCE methodology has several side improvements which can lead to new concrete 
applications such as: “Reputational” Search Engines (RSE) and “Reputational” Social 
Bookmarking (RSB).
“Reputational” Search Engines (RSE) are inspired by Social Network Search Engines, 
which are a class of search engines that use social networks to organize, prioritize or filter 
search results. There are two subclasses of social network search engines: those that use 
explicit social networks and those that use implicit social networks.
1. Explicit social network search engines allow people to find each other according 
to explicitly stated social relationships, for example, allowing people to share their 
relationships on their own sites or pages.
2. Implicit  social network search engines allow people to filter search results based 
upon classes of social networks they trust, such as a shared political viewpoint. 
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The RCE methodology could be the basis for a new Implicit Social Network Search 
Engine called “Reputational” Search Engine (RSE), wich indexes users according to their 
reputation and usersʼ resources according to the contents and the reputation of the 
authors, which may very well change over time.
“Reputational” Search Engines (RSE) can also be enhanced with “Reputational” Social 
Bookmarking (RSB).
The idea behind RSB in a RCE system is that, since it is possible to filter members 
according to their reputations, it is more convenient to bookmark a trusted author rather 
than just his resources. This approach will allow the possibility to retrieve trusted and 
updated resources by a keywords search restricted on the bookmarked authors, 
throughout the future.
However, this approach contrasts with regular web page bookmarking, which probably 
would be less effective inside an RCE system.
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